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STOP GLORIFYING FASHION PIRACY: IT IS
TIME TO ENACT THE INNOVATIVE DESIGN
PROTECTION ACT
KEYON LO 1

“[C]opyright law will…stimulate and secure creative minds to develop
their own designs and to be creative and independent. The United States could
ride the crest of a new revolutionary fashion, fueled by the creative potential of
their young designers.” 2
NATHALIE DOUCET
PRESIDENT OF THE ARTS OF FASHION FOUNDATION

1. B.A. (Hons) in Fashion Design and Textile (HKPOLYU), J.D. (CUHK), P.C.L.L. (HKU),
M.B.A. (HKUST), LL.M. (HLS). The Author wishes to thank his parents for their everlasting love, guidance in everything he does in life and their support during the COVID-19 pandemic. He would also like
to thank Professors Ruth Okediji, Rebecca Tushnet for always encouraging his writing and helping him
cultivate ideas into this Article. Lastly, the author wants to thank Jane Bestor, Shani Shisha, Martin Cox
and his peers for their insightful sharing in the Winter Writing Group and the Writing Group on Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence and the Law. The author also appreciates very much the editors of
the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property for their constructive comments and helpful suggestions. Views and errors in this Article are those of the author’s only.
2. See Nathalie Doucet, Challenges, ARTS OF FASHION FOUNDATION (Jan. 18, 2018),
http://www.arts-of-fashion.org/The%20Foundation/pages/+AoFFoundation.html
[https://perma.cc/VHA3-NL5H].
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ABSTRACT
The current low-IP regime in the United States fails to provide adequate
protection for fashion designs. Multiple bills had been proposed in Congress to
extend copyright protection to fashion designs, but none of these was passed.
Proponents of the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine suggest that unregulated copying is paradoxically beneficial to fashion designers and can foster innovation.
This paper shows that the doctrine reflects a clear misunderstanding of fashion
theories and how fashion trends are formed. It further argues that the fashion
industry requires a diverse portfolio of inspired works rather than line-by-line
knockoffs to foster trend formation. The Innovative Design Protection Act is a
well-thought-out bill that can maximize the welfare of fashion designers, copyists, and the public. Congress needs to extend limited sui generis copyright protection to fashion designs that can prohibit fashion piracy without interfering
with the production of inspired works.

Keywords:
Fashion, Piracy Paradox, Line-by-Line Copy, Inspired Work, Innovative
Design Protection Act
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, scholars have glorified fashion piracy to be something
paradoxically beneficial to the industry and have thought that fashion designers should take unregulated copying of their designs as “homage” rather
than “piracy.” 3 These scholars assume that fashion designers are copyists
themselves and assert that giving fashion designers basic rights to protect
their designs will slow down the fashion cycle. 4 Fashion, in many fashion
designers’ minds, is not just a career or an interest — it is their dream. 5 They
dream to express their aesthetic perspectives, to have their talents recognized, and to have their designs appreciated. 6 They do not want to see their
designs being distorted or copied without a credit. 7 Indeed, money is not the
prime reason these creative talents design, but without the opportunity to recoup their investments, they have to find other ways to sustain a living. 8 This
paper challenges the proposition that a three-year limited, sui generis copyright protection for fashion designs is more harmful than beneficial to the
industry and wider society. In this paper, I will explain why the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine is a misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the fashion
industry and trend, and why the Innovative Design Protection Act (IDPA)
will not hinder innovation but rather foster a creative and respectful fashion
culture in the United States.
Part I of this paper explains the piracy problems faced by fashion designers in the United States and how fast fashion retailers threaten their businesses, particularly in this technological era. Part II of this paper provides a
summary of how intellectual property (IP) laws in the United States protect
various aspects of fashion designs and their corresponding limitations. Part
III of this paper provides criticism of the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine through
a fashion designer’s lens and illustrates how the doctrine might be unsupported and inapplicable in the contemporary American fashion culture. Part
IV of this paper examines the compatibility of the IDPA with different copyright theories and the potential benefits it may bring to the society. Part V
3. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy and Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (2006) (“Design copying is occasionally
complained about, but it is as often celebrated as ‘homage’ as it is attacked as ‘piracy.’”); see also Sara
Marcketti & Jean Parsons, Design Piracy and Self-Regulation: The Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, 1932-1941, 24 CLOTHING & TEXTILE RSCH. J. 214, 216-220 (2006).
4. See id. at 1722.
5. See generally LISA SPRINGSTEEL, BECOMING A FASHION DESIGNER (2013); see also generally
MARY GEHLHAR, THE FASHION DESIGNER SURVIVAL GUIDE: START AND RUN YOUR OWN FASHION
BUSINESS, SIMON AND SCHUSTER (2021)(“If you are doing this just to be famous, forget it. The fashion
world requires hard work, discipline, perseverance, and passion. There is no magic formula or secret to
success, and while designers can learn from others, they each must find their own path.”); see also generally Olivia Martinez, The Inner Mind of a Fashion Designer, S. Ill. Univ. Carbondale Graduate Thesis
(2018).
6. See id.
7. See Amy Adler & Fromer Jeanne, Taking Intellectual Property into Their Own Hands, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 1455, 1502 (2019).
8. See id.
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of this paper summarizes the underlying implications of enacting the IDPA
in fostering an innovative and respectful American fashion culture that will
benefit the fashion industry and the society in the long term.
I. FASHION PIRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Fast Fashion Retailers or Fast Fashion Pirates?
The fast-fashion retailing business model first emerged in the late 1980s
when Zara opened its stores in New York and was recognized by New York
Times as a “Fast Fashion Retailer” because of its incredibly fast production
business model that brings fashion trends from designs to stores and ultimately customers in just about two weeks. 9 When I first learned about this
business model as a fashion design student, I was impressed; I genuinely
believed that Zara must have a team of talented fashion designers that could
efficiently predict seasonal trends and bring affordable creative designs to
customers in a timely manner. 10 However, the “beautiful” truth of being able
to launch their “designs” so fast is that they copy the hard work of others. 11
The success of their business model relies on copying others’ designs and
quickly releasing knockoffs to stores, sometimes even faster than the original
designers, so that they can deprive the original designers of their first-mover
advantage. 12 Fast-fashion products are often more affordable because creating by copying can significantly reduce the costs of design and ultimately
costs of production. 13 The fast-fashion business model minimizes the need
for creative input, 14 such that companies can reduce the design lead-time and
facilitate the process of frequent inventory adjustment to lower the production costs and provide customers with so-called “affordable items.” 15

9. See PANKAJ GHEMAWAT, JOSE LUIS NUENO & MELISSA DAILEY, ZARA: FAST FASHION 8-12
(2003); see also Caitlin Stover, The Fashion Emergency: Protection at a Price, 17 COLO. TECH. LJ 241,
261 (2018).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Fernando Suarez & Gianvito Lanzolla, The Half-Truth of First-Mover Advantage, HARV.
BUS. REV. MAR.-APR. 2005, at 121, 122 (describing how first-mover status is not guaranteed and much
depends on the circumstances); see also Julie Zerbo, Protecting Fashion Designs: Not Only What, But
Who, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 595, 598 (2016) (“[R]enowned fast fashion retailers, as their business models
are based almost entirely on the offering of inexpensive, line—for—line replicas of designs of both established design houses and sought—after emerging design labels, alike. Thus, enabling them to earn a
profit thanks to lower unit costs and the avoided expense of design.”).
13. See GHEMAWAT, NUENO & DAILEY, supra note 8, at 9-10.
14. See Michael A. Cortez et al., Fast Fashion Quadrangle: An Analysis, 18 ACAD. MKTG. STUD.
J. 14, 1-16 (2014) (quoting statement of vice president for merchandising statement on the fact that “[T]he
company does not employ designers, ‘just very savvy designers’ to lower the cost of their operation.”).
15. See id. at 3; see also Mark Brewer, Fashion Law: More than Wigs, Gowns, and Intellectual
Property, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 739, 760-61 (2017).
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Although the reduction in production costs is partially a result of good
business administration decisions including supply chain management, inventory management, human resource management, or brand management, 16
it is also partially due to the appropriation of the hard work of other fashion
designers who invested their money, time, and often dreams in their designs
and might not get repaid due to the current low-IP regime. 17
If we look at a traditional fashion business model, designing and testing
are one of the most costly and time-consuming steps. 18 Some people call
fashion designers the engines of fashion brands. 19 When Phoebe Philo left
Céline in 2018, the brand lost a substantial amount of loyal customers 20 and
people in the industry commented that the brand “is dead.” 21 Nonetheless, it
is uncommon to see fashion brands provide comprehensive training and generous retention bonuses to fashion designers in order to retain their talents to
continue design production in line with the brand image and appealing to
their customers; there are not many such prestigious positions available in
the industry either. 22 Although designers are vital to a brand, there is a high
supply of aspiring designers and a limited demand for them. 23 Thus, designers often do not have much market power despite their importance in the
16. See Cortez et al., supra note 13, at 3-5 (“Zara maintains a higher level of control throughout the
organization….Moreover, by locating its supplier in close proximity to the headquarters, Zara has a faster
and more advanced communication system and workforces. Besides production, inventory management
is also an indispensable factor to reduce production lead time”); see also MARK O. GEORGE, THE LEAN
SIX SIGMA GUIDE TO DOING MORE WITH LESS: CUT COSTS, REDUCE WASTE, AND LOWER YOUR
OVERHEAD (2010).
17. See Victoria Ledezma, Globalization and Fashion: Too Fast, Too Furious, 4 Laurier Undergraduate J. Arts 9, 6 (2017) (“Copying designs is not the only way fast-fashion retailers manufacture their
clothing faster. To make these clothes in less time, companies need a lot of labour, and to keep costs
down, fast-fashion retailers depend on cheap labour in underdeveloped countries.”); see also Sangeeta
Singh-Kurtz, Fast Fashion Exploits Everyone it Touches, QUARTZ (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://qz.com/quartzy/1367669/fast-fashion-exploits-everyone-it-touches/
[https://perma.cc/C89JUBZZ].
18. See TIM JACKSON, THE PROCESS OF FASHION TREND DEVELOPMENT LEADING TO A SEASON, IN
FASHION MARKETING: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 121-32 (2001) (providing a chart of the process of apparel design and product development); see also generally ERIC WILSON, FASHION INDUSTRY, IN THE
BERG COMPANION TO FASHION, (Valerie Steele eds., 2010); see also Marta Sponsiello, Fashion Design’s
Low-IP Protection: The Relationship Between Copycats and Innovation in the Fast Fashions’ Era 12-14,
(2019) (Master’s Degree Thesis, Luiss Guido Carli) (on file with LuissThesis).
19. See PETER MCNEIL, FASHION DESIGNERS, IN BERG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD DRESS AND
FASHION: WEST EUROPE 129-36 (Lise Skov eds., 2010).
20. See Gabrielle Arruda, Why Celine Just Isn’t the Same Since Hedi, GABRIELLE ARRUDA (Jun.
20,
2019),
https://gabriellearruda.com/why-celine-just-isnt-the-same-since-hedi/
[https://perma.cc/Z2WR-H7ZA].
21. See Emilia Petrarca, Céline Is Dead, Long Live Céline, THE CUT (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://www.thecut.com/2018/01/hedi-slimane-celine-phoebe-philo.html
[https://perma.cc/2W9AXPMH].
22. See PAMELA GIBSON, DESIGNERS AND MODELS BECOME BRANDS, IN FASHION AND
CELEBRITY CULTURE 183-206 (2012); see also Kati Chitrakorn, What Makes a Popular Luxury Fashion
Brand?, VOGUE BUSINESS (Jun. 5, 2020), https://www.voguebusiness.com/companies/what-makes-apopular-luxury-fashion-brand [https://perma.cc/UU8P-Q8EL]; see also T. S. Lee, C. S. Leung & Z. M.
Zhang, Fashion Brand Image Marketing: Brand Image and Brand Personality, 4 RSCH. J. TEXTILE &
APPAREL 60 (2000) (describing brand image and brand personality).
23. See id.
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system. 24 Many emerging fashion designers might never reach celebrated
levels if their work is stolen without consent rather than fostered by collaboration. 25 Unfortunately, this is how the current copyright law stands. Copying fashion designs is currently legal in the United States and fast-fashion
retailers do not seem to have much incentive or intent to foster collaboration
with emerging fashion designers or small brands. 26 Young design talents
who have yet developed any market power often lose opportunities to recoup
their investments even though their designs are “chosen/copied” by these fast
fashion brands. 27 Research shows that it is quite commonplace for some fastfashion retailers to budget a set amount of money each year to handle expected IP disputes, and oftentimes they will either take down the products
from their stores or settle with the fashion designers after “stealing” their
designs. 28 Fast-fashion retailers will also appropriate the work of less estab-

24. See id.
25. See A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14-15
(2006) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 5055] (statement of Jeffrey Banks, Fashion Designer, on behalf of
the CFDA, criticizing that “some have argued that protecting fashion will drive up costs, accessibility
and ultimately harm consumers….In fact, the same could be said for the protection of music, movies,
software and books. If these works weren’t protected by copyright, if new technologies weren’t protected
by patents, wouldn’t prices come down for consumers?”).
26. See Bashirat Oladele, Small Designers Fall Victim to Larger Brands Stealing their Designs,
THE BOAR (Aug. 18, 2020), https://theboar.org/2020/08/small-designers-victim-larger-brands-stealingdesigns/ [https://perma.cc/9YF6-ME7R] (“[S]ome fashion brands have a notorious reputation for stealing
designs from other creatives and designers…Designs continue to be stolen unless trademarked by the
designer….It appears that in the US, it is easy for brands to steal designs from independent designers
because of the lack of legal protection over these designs.”); see also Ledezma, supra note 16, at 6 (“Popular retailer Forever 21 has been sued and has settled over fifty claims for stealing prints and designs from
designers…. The company has come to realize that it can gain more from the production and sale of
copied designs than it loses in court. Therefore, it is actually a more profitable strategy for fast-fashion
companies to infringe on copyrights and settle the suits later than it is for them to license a design in the
first place.”)
27. .See Irene Tan, Knock it Off, Forever 21! The Fashion Industry’s Battle Against Design Piracy,
18 J.L. & POL’Y 893, 900 (2009) “A representative for the CFDA stated that “[a]lthough a designer can
spend tens of thousands to mount their runway show to reveal their new lines, they frequently don’t even
recoup their investments. Their designs are stolen before the applause has faded [because] software programs develop patterns from photographs taken at the show and automated machines then cut and stitch
copies of designers work from those patterns.”; see also Sarah Young, Shein: Fast Fashion Retailer Accused of ‘Stealing’ Independent Brand’s Design, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 22, 2020, 4:44 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/fashion/emma-warren-shein-stolen-design-bee-hoodie-instagram-a9683551.html [https://perma.cc/AD3H-TNJA](“ @sheinofficial should be ashamed of themselves
for stealing designs from small businesses….I know they’re notorious for it. They do it a lot….That’s
fast fashion for you. It’s infuriating because they’re selling it for a third of the price as well….Emma went
on to ask why big fashion companies such as Shein do not consider working with independent designer
on a freelance basis instead of simply taking their designs.”); see also generally NORMA RANTISI, HOW
NEW YORK STOLE MODERN FASHION, IN FASHION’S WORLD CITIES 109-22 (Christopher Breward & David Gilbert eds., 2006).
28. See Tan, supra note 26, at 900-02 (quoting an empirical study to show that Forever 21 was a
defendant in over fifty suits for copyright and trademark infringement in five years and many of them
were eventually settled out of court); see also Julia Brucculieri, How Fast Fashion Brands Get Away With
Copying Designers, HUFFPOST (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fast-fashion-copycats_n_5b8967f9e4b0511db3d7def6 [https://perma.cc/4T9Y-VBFM](“According to Zerbo, it’s commonplace for some fast fashion brands to budget a set amount of money each year to pay settlements.

2022

STOP GLORIFYING FASHION PIRACY

167

lished fashion designers who would rather invest their money in future designs than spend it on complex legal actions. 29 The fast fashion retailers are
well aware that they are exploiting the IP law loophole in the United States
and have no intention to stop unless the law is changed. 30
Nonetheless, some scholars assert that this common practice of copying
in the fashion industry induces fashion trend formation. 31 I remain skeptical
about their views and will provide a detailed analysis in this paper to explain
why their assertions are based on a misunderstanding of fashion theories and
trends. I recommend anyone who reads this paper to take a look at these
articles entitled “The Most Shameless High Fashion Knockoffs of 2017,”32
and “Zara, Forever 21, Top Shop and H&M, Etc.. Are Offering Cheap Copies of High Fashion.” 33 You will find there are various degrees of copying,
some copy more, such as Forever 21, and some copy less, like Zara and
H&M. 34 Most of the knockoff products are “substantially similar” 35 to the
originals in color, shape, arrangement of details, choice of material, etc. Inhouse fashion designers of these fast fashion brands do not change much of
the design; they intend to appropriate it entirely. 36 To produce the most prof-

That’s not necessarily an admission of guilt, it just might be smarter move in terms of spending resources….it’s an issue that emerging designers often can’t afford to be locked in a legal battle with a
retail giant…. for designers who consider their work to be art, seeing it get copied and diluted is almost
like being “robbed.”“); see also Gil Appel, Barak Libai & Eitan Muller, On the Monetary Impact of
Fashion Design Piracy, 35 INT’L. J. RSCH. MKTG. 591, 591-593 (2018); see also Elizabeth Vulaj, Will
Fast Fashion Go out of Style Soon? How Couture Designers, Celebrities, and Luxury Brands Fighting
Back May Change the Future Legal Landscape for Mass Affordable Retailers, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L. J. 197, 211 (2020).
29. See Jake Palmer, Why Young Designers are Using Social Media to Shame Fast Fashion Copycats?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=063b21db-bc864d5b-be11-df1e5d7d1c5f [https://perma.cc/YP3L-25T9].
30. See id.
31. See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION
SPARKS INNOVATION (2012)(“Surprisingly, fashion designs are not covered by copyright law. What Faviana does is perfectly legal—and very common….The development of new apparel designs continues
every day at a dizzying pace. Indeed, the American fashion industry has never been more creative. All
this copying has not killed the fashion industry. In fact, fashion not only survives despite copying; it
thrives due to copying…”)
32. See Stephanie Eckardt, The Most Shameless High Fashion Knockoffs of 2017, W MAGAZINE
(Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.wmagazine.com/gallery/most-shameless-high-fashion-knockoffs-2017
[https://perma.cc/SSX6-WWTV].
33. See Bego Ore, Zara, Forever 21, Topshop and H&M, etc.. are Offering Cheap Copies of High
Fashion, LIFESTYLEOFAFASHIONISTA (Jul. 25, 2016), https://medium.com/@FASHIONISTA/zaraforever-21-top-shop-and-h-m-etc-are-offering-cheap-copies-of-high-fashion-d9c33dfa3be7
[https://perma.cc/3D94-XGNZ].
34. See Tan, supra note 26, at 901, 915 (“Forever 21, a Fortune 500 company, is considered by
some as the “most notorious copyist retailer” and is the target of over fifty lawsuits for copyright and
trademark infringement….In comparison, only two copyright and trademark infringement lawsuits hae
been filed against Forever 21’s competitor, H&M. This vast discrepancy in lawsuits can be attributed to
the fact that H&M “engage[s] in loose design ‘referencing’ by borrowing high fashion ideas and interpreting them for the masses,” while Forever 21 generally copies a design to the very last detail.”)
35. See infra Part IV.A (explaining why the “substantially identically” standard of the IDPA is a
generous threshold for fashion knockoffs).
36. See generally Singh-Kurtz, supra note 16.
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itable knockoffs, they only copy popular seasonal items and minimize alterations to the original designs such that customers on a budget will recognize
the designs and buy the knockoffs instead of the originals. 37 Line-by-line
knockoff is essentially a “counterfeit without a fake trademark.” 38 Although
inspired works are beneficial to the industry, line-by-line knockoffs are not. 39
While fashion should be made affordable for everybody, this does not justify
the practice of fast fashion retailers of stealing designs. 40 Fast-fashion retailers are true “pirates” in the industry 41 and they are known to be professional
in stealing designs from others. 42 If we continue to allow fast-fashion retailers to exploit the IP law loophole and copy the work of other designers with
little consequence, more fashion designers will be put out of business or become fashion pirates themselves. 43 I doubt that the United States would like
to foster this kind of fashion culture.
B. Threats Caused by Fashion Piracy to Fashion Designers in the Technological Era and Feedback from Industry Stakeholders
Lazaro Hernandez, a well-known fashion designer speaking on behalf
of the Council of Fashion Designers of America (CFDA), testified before the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property regarding
the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act
(IDPPPA)(hereinafter Subcommittee). Hernandez revealed that while
emerging fashion designers put their imaginations to work and spend thousands of dollars in preparation for a fashion show, fashion pirates can wipe
fashion designers out in a single season. 44 Running a fashion business is

37. See Vertica Bhardwaj & Ann Fairhurst, Fast Fashion: Response to Changes in the Fashion
Industry, 20 INT’L REV. RETAIL DISTRIB. & CONSUMER RSCH. 165, 169-70 (2010).
38. See Tan, supra note 26, at 894 (“The blatant copying of another’s designs is akin to counterfeiting without affixing the fake designer label.”); see also Joel Hietanen et al., Paradox and Market Renewal: Knockoffs and Counterfeits as Doppelg. . .nger Brand Images of Luxury, 36 MKT. INTEL. & PLAN.
750, 8 (2018)(“Knockoff and counterfeit offerings do not necessarily signify binary distinctions in the
market vis-à-vis genuine offerings, but rather create paradoxical symbols that differentiate and complement.”).
39. See infra Part III.B.
40. See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 2511 Before the
H. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing on
H.R. 2511] (statement of Lazaro Hernandez, Fashion Designer & Co-Founder of Proenza Schouler).
41. See Dayoung Chung, Law, Brands, and Innovation: How Trademark Law Helps to Create Fashion Innovation, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 492, 495 (2018); see also Jessica Rosen, The
Inability of Intellectual Property to Protect the New Fashion Designer: Why the ID3PA Should be
Adopted, 43 GOLDEN GATE UL REV. 327, 344 (2013); see also generally Randal Picker, Of Pirates and
Puffy Shirts: A Comment on the Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design,
328 Va. L. Rev., Forthcoming, Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper (2007).
42. See Donald Sull & Stefano Turconi, Fast Fashion Lessons, 19 BUS. STRATEGY REV. 4, 6 (2008)
(describing the fast fashion retail strategy of adapting merchandise assortments to current and emerging
trends as quickly and effectively as possible).
43. See infra Part V.C.
44. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
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tough and fashion designers find it tougher because of a lack of legal protection. 45 Professor Susan Scafidi, founder and director of the Fashion Law Institute at Fordham Law School, said that the exact cost of being knocked off
and the resulting loss of sales is “notoriously difficult to quantify.” 46 At the
time of writing, there are insufficient empirical studies, and studies that do
exist provide limited evidential data on how much harm fashion piracy has
caused to fashion designers. 47 Proponents of fashion design protection
should conduct further empirical studies in this area to provide more reliable
and supporting data to assess the damage caused by piracy to fashion designers. Fashion piracy might not be extremely harmful to some types of fashion
designers (although no data exists to support the conclusion), yet fashion piracy has certainly jeopardized the incentives of many individual fashion designers who lose orders every day. 48 As suggested by Jessica Silbey, scholars
might understand the problems encountered by fashion designers by listening to what the industry stakeholders say. 49 Legal scholars can also infer
from fashion designers’ experiences that the hypothesis proposed by some

45. See id.
46. See Helena Pike, What are the Consequences of Copycats?, BUSINESS OF FASHION ( Mar. 14,
2016), https://www.businessoffashion.com/community/voices/discussions/what-is-the-real-cost-of-copycats/fashions-copycat-economy [https://perma.cc/5M98-RQHB].
47. See Gil Appel et al., The Short- and Long-Term Impacts of Fashion Knockoffs on Original
Items, 13 MSI Report, 20, 20-26 (2013) (an empirical study conducted by Appel et al. in 2013, revealed
that the introduction of knockoffs damaged the net present value(-13.1%) of originals in a single year,
and may harm original designs more than Raustiala and Sprigman proposed. However, the actual harm
caused to fashion designers is still uncertain.); see also Gil Appel et al., supra note 27, at 602-606 (Appel
et al. further conducted a similar empirical study in 2017. Nevertheless, the study covers only 20 specific
fashion items collected using Google Trends and can hardly represent the general US fashion industry
nor can it measure the harm caused by copying in the American fashion industry.”); see also Anna Huoviala, Gatekeepers - How Designers Add Value in the Fast Fashion Process, 44-48, 82 (2015) (In 2015,
Anna Huoviala conducted semi-structured interviews with five professional designers from London, Barcelona, Helsinki and Stockholm to obtain their views about their roles in the fast fashion industry. The
overall feedback was that fashion designers are the gatekeepers of brands, but that they are also responsible for adding value to exciting fashion trends. Being able to produce creative products to customers is
how they are motivated. Nevertheless, the study did not interview American fashion designers and the
sample size was limited); see also Alice Janssens & Mariangela Lavanga, An Expensive, Confusing, and
Ineffective Suit of Armor: Investigating Risks of Design Ppiracy and Perceptions of the Design Rights
Available to Emerging Fashion Designers in the Digital Age, 2 J. DRESS, BODY & CULTURE 229, 231
(2020) (In 2019, Professors Alice Janssens and Mariangela Lavanga conducted a study to investigate the
risk of fashion piracy and perceptions of design rights available to UK-based emerging fashion designers.
They applied a qualitative approach and interviewed fourteen designers. In their findings, they highlighted that emerging fashion designers lack knowledge of the rights available to them. They also argued
that “while this still seems to be true for established fashion brands which can rely on extensive legal
advice, the high speed of the contemporary fashion system, its internationalization and medialization may
curtail the first mover advantage of emerging fashion designers, putting their businesses under threat.” I
would propose that a similar study conducted in the US to determine how American fashion designers
have been threaten by fashion priacy. To date, no relevant empirical studies have been conducted in the
US that can provide evidential data to support either side’s assertion.).
48. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
49. See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015)(Silbey in her book conducted fifty in-depth interviews with a broad
range of people in New England and New York, including inventors, musicians, artists, filmmakers, and
writers, as well as business agents and attorneys active in intellectual property–intensive industries to
understand the various IP issues they encountered in their respective sectors.)
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scholars that piracy is not harmful to fashion designers—to a certain extent
is not entirely true. 50
Big fashion brands are not afraid of being sued by fashion designers. 51
Carrie Anne Roberts is a fashion designer and a single mom who sells “Mere
Soeur” t-shirts and other baby fashion items to her customers based in the
United States via Instagram. 52 She found that Old Navy had knocked off her
designs and sold them at a much lower price within a day or so. 53 Roberts
then sent an email to Old Navy and the company’s response was that the
design did not carry any trademark and therefore she had no legal ground of
a claim—which is unfortunately true under the current low IP regime. 54 Although Roberts received many supportive comments from her followers,
there was nothing much she could do. 55 In an Instagram post, Roberts complained that big businesses take small businesses as sources of ideas and
think they are too weak to fight back. 56 As a single mother, Roberts reveals
that the original design was very meaningful to her and the knockoff had
destroyed the meaning behind her work. 57 Roberts is just one of the many
victims of fashion piracy who need to be mentioned in academic discourse. 58
Fast fashion retailers have also routinely imitated designs from Native American tribes, indigenous groups, fashion design competition participants, design students, and many others. 59 As Lazaro Hernandez said, the United
States has become a haven for copyists who steal designers’ works and sell
them as their own with no fear of consequences. 60

50. See Marjorie Yang, A Model Stakeholder Strategy from the Garment Industry, HARV. B. REV.
(Oct. 6, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/10/a-model-stakeholder-strategy-f [https://perma.cc/V9C4-HS7G].
51. See Chavie Lieber, Fashion Brands Steal Design Ideas All the Time. And it’s completely legal.
Blame
America’s
outdated
copyright
laws,
VOX
(Apr.
27,
2018,
7:30
AM),https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17281022/fashion-brands-knockoffs-copyright-stolen-designsold-navy-zara-h-and-m [https://perma.cc/6KVX-8P9G].
52. See Murray Fairclough, Rag-Trade Rip-Off, OPUS UNDERWRITING (Sep. 10, 2019),
https://opusunderwriting.com/rag-trade-rip-off/ [https://perma.cc/VD3V-DWTK].
53. See id.; See also Figure 1.
54. See Yang, supra note 49.
55. See id.
56. See id. (“They have so much more money, and they know that pursuing these lawsuits is very
costly and a lot of artists can’t afford to go through with them”…expecting them to…”cave in and not do
anything, or settle for a really low amount.”).
57. See id.; see also infra Part IV.C.
58. See id.
59. See id.; see also Chavie Lieber, Beyond Elle Woods: The Rise of Fashion Law, RACKED (Jan.
15, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.racked.com/2015/1/15/7561277/fashion-law [https://perma.cc/7RTSTT4T]; see also TFL, Artisans and Indigenous People are Sick of Fashion Brands’ Inspirations,
THEFASHIONLAW (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/artisans-are-sick-of-serving-as-fashion-brands-inspiration/ [https://perma.cc/7RJY-S7L9].
60. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 3 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
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Figure 1: Comparison between Carrie Ann Roberts’ T-shirt (left) and Old
Navy’s Knockoff (right). 61
Developments in technology ramp up fashion piracy to a whole new
level in the twenty-first century. 62 The COVID-19 pandemic has also notably changed the fashion industry. 63 Consumers now see a rapidly growing
number of online fashion shows given by avatars, 64 and industry experts
foresee that virtual fitting options will soon be available. 65 The fashion industry expects to see even more fashion designs being widely promoted on
social media platforms, which may offer almost unlimited opportunities for
copyists. 66 The cost of copying has never been lower.67 An empirical study
conducted in the United Kingdom in 2019 shows that digital platforms have
further threatened fashion designers’ ownership of their designs. 68 This is
akin to the early age of digital music distribution in the 1990s when the recorded music industry was seriously hit by digital downloads and interactive
61. See Evolving World, Support Independent Designers, MATTEBRAND (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://mattebrand.com/blogs/blogs/support-independent-designers [https://perma.cc/TVA2-Z7BT].
62. See ALESSANDRA L. ROYO, VISITING MALLS AND BUYING ONLINE: SHOPPING FOR STYLE,
IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN FASHION: THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, 100-102 (2020).
63. See IFA, Post covid-19 Assessment in the Fashion Industry: What Changes for What Future?,
IFAPARIS (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.ifaparis.com/media/news/2020/post-covid-19-assessment-fashion-industry-what-changes-what-future [https://perma.cc/YJ4W-D7SD].
64. See Ritupriya Basu, As COVID-era Fashion Shows Go Virtual, New Opportunities for Designers Emerge, EYEONDESIGN (Nov. 30, 2020), https://eyeondesign.aiga.org/as-fashion-shows-go-virtualin-the-covid-era-new-opportunities-for-designers-emerge/ [https://perma.cc/R65Z-S9XV].
65. See Abha Bhattarai, Virtual Try-Ons are Replacing Fitting Rooms during the Pandemic, WASH.
POST (Jul. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/09/virtual-try-ons-are-replacing-fitting-rooms-during-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/68PT-F4KE].
66. See Riadh Ladhari, Jessica Gonthier & Mathieu Lajante, Generation Y and Online Fashion
Shopping: Orientations and Profiles, 48 J. RTL. CONSR. SERV. 113, 113-21 (2019).
67. See id.
68. See Janssens & Lavanga, supra note 46, at 251 (“A cogent concern presented in the open response section of the survey was that piracy “stunts the desire to promote online” (open answer from
survey respondent). Not only does this allude to the impact that design piracy may have upon firms’
actions, but it is pertinent given the growing importance of digital tools to the fashion industry. The comment suggests that the locus of piracy may not just be the physical market, but also online mechanisms,
limiting designers’ freedom upon a potentially key sales platform.”).
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streaming; 69 and digital fashion has the potential to be widely copied and
resold instantly. 70 When fashion designers upload their designs, it would be
almost impossible for them to control how people use their designs. If it is
free, who would want to pay?
Jai Nice, an independent fashion designer with a small online brand in
the United States, found Fashion Nova had copied many of her designs in
the past few years. 71 As early as 2018, when she had no website, Nice recalled Fashion Nova ordered several products from her on Instagram and
eventually returned those items to her. 72 Now that Nice has a website with
high-resolution photos of her designs from different angles, she has not received more orders from Fashion Nova but still sees knockoff versions of
her designs on their website. 73 It is evident how “shameless” these copyists
can be and how “helpless” independent fashion designers are.74 In the midst
of the COVID-19 pandemic Tyler Mccall, editor-in-chief of Fashionista, expressed her worries about young American fashion designers being wiped
out by the pandemic, as they are not “as protected by massive conglomerates
as their peers in Europe.” 75 IP law protection for fashion designs in the
United States is still lagging far behind many other countries in the world
with leading fashion capitals. 76
69. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that it is
like developing their hit song…was stolen and recorded by someone else, with no credit to the songwriter….It is very hard to survive when you become the victim of this type of theft); see also Hearing on
H.R. 5055, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Jeffrey Banks saying that “just as the internet has transformed our sister creative industries like music, books…creating opportunities as well as problems.”);
see also Seth Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of Online Music Distribution:
Innovation in the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1805-13 (2011)(“ These
circumstances led to the P2P dilemma, the slow development of the OMD market, and the institutional
crisis of copyright…. Since copyright’s basic objective is creation and its revenue objectives but a means
to that end, this is the underlying copyright question. . . . And its answer is far from clear.”).
70. See Carolyn Martin & Margaret Horstman, AI and Copyright in the Fashion Industry, LUTZKER
& LUTZKER LLP (Jun. 30, 2021), https://www.lutzker.com/ai-and-copyright-in-the-fashion-industry/
[https://perma.cc/U2TL-HMR3] (“The Fabricant even gives away its digital clothes for non-commercial
use and has encouraged individuals to download their files and experiment with three-dimensional digital
fashion themselves. They do this by posting downloads on their website that anyone can access at no
cost….However, similar to music and movies, digital fashion has the potential to be widely copied and
resold. If a company wants to charge the public for digital garments, they will have to find a way to
prevent customers from copying the files.”).
71. See Marquaysa Battle, Black Fashion Designers Are Exposing Fashion Nova For Stealing Their
Original Work, REVELIST (Apr. 26, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.revelist.com/style-news/fashionnova-knock-off-designers/15005 [https://perma.cc/J2YU-5WDT].
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that we
are helpless against copyists who prey on our ideas).
75. See Tyler Mccall, An Open Letter for American Designers. What Can We Do for You?,
FASHIONISTA (Mar. 23, 2020), https://fashionista.com/2020/03/fashion-designers-op-eds-coronaviruscovid19 [https://perma.cc/DD3D-MWUA].
76. See Roberto Caso & Valentina Mazza, The Protection of Fashion Design Against Copying: A
Comparative Analysis, 2 ANNO ACCADEMICO 9, 13-28 (2017) (summarizing France offers a strong and
explicit form of protection for fashion designs under its copyright law, as well as under its industrial
design law; European Union and United Kingdom provide registered and unregistered design protection
that include fashion designs; Italy provides protection for fashion designs under the umbrella of “industrial” design works that have creative character or inherent artistic character).
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The US IP laws provide little protection to fashion designs and are fostering a copying rather than innovating culture in the fashion industry that
fast fashion retailers exploit others’ designs as of right. 77 Scholars construed
this lack of full protection for fashion design as a “Low-IP Equilibrium” and
believed it is the key to the industry’s success. 78 Kim Kardashian, a celebrity
and an owner of a fashion boutique, posted a photo of her wearing a dress
designed by her husband, Kanye West on her Instagram and found it being
knocked off by Missguided the other day. 79 She requested on her Instagram
“Fast fashion brands, can you please wait until I wear this in real life before
you knock it off?” 80 This kind of unethical copyright has become commonplace and entrenched in the American fashion industry. 81 Somehow the right
now becomes wrong, as the wrong becomes right and the US IP laws must
address fashion piracy. 82 Missguided replied to Kardashian that “[t]he devil
works hard but Missguided works harder…you’ve only got a few days before
this drops online.” 83 This online exchange exemplifies how copying designs
fast and selling them cheap seems again to be a “shameless” victory in the
fast fashion industry. 84 Some brands such as Chanel might credit the original
fashion designers as their inspiration and have shown respect of small artisans, but most copyists do not. 85 Since copying is legal in the fashion industry, fast fashion retailers rarely invest in their fashion designers. 86 There is
even less incentive for retailers to license designs from independent designers, after all, because fashion designers create most designs for one single
season. 87 To protect local talents, lawmakers should strengthen the current
copyright law to better protect fashion designs ahead of the forthcoming rise
77. See infra Part IV.D.
78. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1698.
79. See Hannah Preston, Kim Kardashian West v. Fast Fashion: Reality Star Wins Millions in Lawsuit Against Missguided, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/kim-kardashianwest-missguided-lawsuit-1447394. [https://perma.cc/HY5E-9C2A]; See also Figure 2.
80. See Lisa Davidson, As Fast Fashion Thievery is Making Headlines Again, We Explore the Sorry
History of Mega-Brands Ripping off Independent Creatives, WEHEART (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.weheart.com/2019/03/25/fast-fashion-rip-off-small-designers-creatives/ [https://perma.cc/WC62-3846].
81. See id.
82. See Alice Wickens, Design Piracy in the United States: Time to Fashion a Remedy?. 24 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 55, 58 (2021)(“ Permitting piracy while prohibiting counterfeits, has led Beltrametti to remark that this situation is clearly wrong and the lawmust address it.”); see also generally Karl
Eikenberry, When a Right Becomes a Wrong, 83 NATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW, 176, 176-183 (1994).
83. See id.
84. See Sponsiello, supra note 17, at 43-53.
85. See Vanessa Friedman, Called Out for Copying Chanel Does the Right Thing, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/fashion/called-out-for-copying-chaneldoes-the-right-thing.html [https://perma.cc/WG37-A59V] (“Chanel not only said it would credit her work
but also added in a statement: “Chanel recognizes that this situation resulted from a dysfunctionality
within its teams and has presented its apologies. Chanel also recognizes the heritage and know-how of
Fair Isle. Chanel wishes to emphasize that the House is extremely vigilant in terms of its respect for
creativity, whether its own or that of others….It has been an oversight from Chanel’s team and I feel that
with their apology and by crediting the design they have shown respect and support of small artisans.”).
86. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that
“licensing deals are then no longer an option.”).
87. See Sponsiello, supra note 17, at 4-15.
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of digital fashion. 88 The current IP regime in the United States regrettably
fails to protect fashion designs.

Figure 2: Comparison between Kardashian West’s Dress (left) and
Missguided’s Knockoff (right)
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
Current IP laws in the United States do not explicitly protect an entire
fashion design, and often fashion designers barely benefit from these statutory IP protections. 89 Fashion designers may rely on three major types of IP
protection to guard some aspects of their designs, copyright law, used to
protect textile or graphic designs; trademark law, used to protect marks or
logos; and design patent law, used to protect original ornamental designs;
nonetheless these IP laws are far from sufficient to protect fashion designs. 90
A. Limitations of Trademark Protection
(1) Trademark Law Prohibits Counterfeits, Not Knockoffs
Trademark law offers effective protection against counterfeits but not
non-confusing knockoffs. 91 Trademarks in the United States are protected by
88. See Antonio Gonzalo et al., Fashion’s Digital Transformation: Now or Never, MCKINSEY &
COMPANY (May 6, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/fashions-digitaltransformation-now-or-never [https://perma.cc/K4N5-PQWE]; see also Hee Kyoung Cho, A Critical
Perspective on Strengthening Legal Protection of Fashion Designs. 11 Northeast Asian Law Review 95,
112-113 (2017).
89. See Brandon Scruggs, Should Fashion Design Be Copyrightable, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 122, 123 (2007).
90. See id. at 123-36.
91. See Kevin Tu, Counterfeit Fashion: the Interplay between Copyright and Trademark Law in
Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. LJ 419, 430-431
(2009)(“Therefore, where the overall appearance of a counterfeit or knockoff design is so similar to an
original design that it causes confusion as to the origin of the counterfeit or knock-off, a claim for trade
dress infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) may be available to the original designer.”); see also Kate
Goldwasser, Knock It Off: An Analysis of Trademark Counterfeit Goods Regulation in the United States,
France, and Belgium, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207, 215-18 (2010).
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the Lanham Act at the federal level, 92 trademark statutes at the state level, 93
and unfair competition principles at the common law level. 94 The Lanham
Act protects a word, name, symbol, device, or any combination thereof—
used by a person to identify a single source of goods or services—from those
goods or services manufactured or sold by others. 95 The Act’s primary principles are to prevent illegal misappropriation of a source-identifying mark,
prevent consumers from confusing trademarks, and reduce customers’ costs
of shopping. 96 The Act does not serve to protect the aesthetic features of
fashion designs. 97 Although there are established brands that have relied on
trademark law to protect their fashion designs by strategically embedding
logos onto their items, 98 those brands have heavily invested in policing any
unauthorized use of their marks. Most of the brands’ marks have acquired a
secondary meaning where customers understand them as source-identifying
marks. 99
Nonetheless, most small fashion brands and individual fashion designers do not incorporate any trademarks in their designs, nor do they have the
same resources to prohibit any unauthorized use of their trademarks proactively. 100 Fast fashion retailers have exploited this very loophole for years
without much consequence 101 and have blatantly produced line-by-line
knockoffs that are essentially “counterfeits without affixing the fake designer
label.” 102 This also explains why old Navy well ignored Roberts’s take-down
request, and why Missguided could publicity admit that it had knocked off
Kardashian’s dress as if it had “won a marathon.” 103 Fast fashion retailers
know how to play the game—and how to play it well. 104 The rule of thumb
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2018).
93. See State Trademark Information Links, USPTO (last visited Mar. 22, 2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/process-overview/state-trademark-information-links
[https://perma.cc/8WBJ-DKY2] (providing a list of state trademark laws).
94. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367, 375 (1999).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
96. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1225 (2007).
97. See Lisa J. Hedrick, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 215, 226 (2008).
98. See Emily S. Day, Double-Edged Scissor’: Legal Protection for Fashion Design, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 237, 248-49 (2007).
99. See id.
100. See Erin Fitzgerald, The Fashion Police: Criminalizing the Knowing Purchase of Trademark
Counterfeit Fashion Items, 47 New Eng. L. Rev. 127, 127-38 (2012); see also Hearing on H.R. 2511,
supra note 39, at 5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that large corporations with …recognized
trademarks can…afford…very few small businesses can compete….)
101. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez)(“As a result,
the U.S. has become a haven for copyists who steal designers’ ideas and sell them as their own with no
fear of consequences.”).
102. See id. at 8; see also Tan, supra note 26, at 894 (“The blatant copying of another’s designs is
akin to counterfeiting without affixing the fake designer label.”).
103. See generally Lieber, supra note 50.
104. See infra Part V.C. (discussing how players in the market will find a way to minimize their
losses and maximize their gains in a game according to the game theory.)
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for fast fashion retailers is to copy the design as close as possible but avoid
incorporating any trademarked elements or patterns. 105
(2) Trade Dress Doctrine Does Not Protect Seasonal Designs
Certain fashion designs can be protected by the trade dress doctrine.106
The Lanham Act offers trade dress protection to the total image of a fashion
item as defined by its overall appearance and design, including: size, shape,
color, and texture. 107 The Act also protects the appearance of an item’s packaging and separate design elements making up the total image by which the
item is presented to customers. 108 Nevertheless, a trade dress must be nonfunctional, distinctive, and used in commerce as a source identifier. 109 Functionality can be examined not just from a utilitarian perspective but also from
an aesthetic perspective. 110 This dual-interpretation of functionality means
that an aesthetic feature of a fashion design cannot provide a significant benefit for the fashion designer which is (i) irreplicable by other kinds of aesthetic features (i.e., unique), and (ii) important in a consumer’s decisionmaking process. 111 Otherwise, the aesthetic feature is functional and cannot
be protected by the trade dress doctrine. 112
There are only a handful of established brands that have successfully
relied on trade dress doctrine to protect some configurations of their designs,
but even so, not the entire appearance.113 The Supreme Court of the United
States (SCOTUS) held that for a product design to be protected by the trade
dress doctrine, the design should have already acquired a “secondary meaning” under trademark law. 114 Fashion designers need to prove that, in the
105. See Tu, supra note 90, at 433(“While fashion designs may qualify for trademark protection in
limited circumstances involving sufficient distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion, protection will
extend only to the original designer’s famous mark. Therefore, the protection of a valid trademark indirectly encompasses a limited number of designs by virtue of the mark’s attachment to a counterfeit item.
Absent a registered mark, an owner may not sue for trademark infringement.”).
106. See Karina K. Terakura, Insufficiency of Trade Dress Protection: Lack of Guidance for Trade
Dress Infringement Litigation in the Fashion Design Industry, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 569, 593 (2000).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2018); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992); see also Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).
108. See Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Priya
Bharathi, There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat
Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1667, 1691 (1996)(“Under the Two Pesos standard, separate elements of a garment design, such as knit material, racer stripes, and neon colors, are protectable under trade dress if together they create unique retro-looking sportswear.”).
109. See Terakura, supra note 105, at 578-89.
110. See Seth Di Asio, Fashion Has No Function: Diminishing the Functionality Bar to Trademark
Protection in the Fashion Industry, 38 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 28, 29-30 (2019).
111. See Jessica Litman, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement under Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 77-97 (1982).
112. See id.
113. See Terakura, supra note 105, at 593-607(discussing trade dress cases in New York, Illinois and
Kansas where trade dress law was applied inconsistently in different states and how limited it is even for
established brands like Samara Brothers to protect their product designs.)
114. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000) (holding that
a product’s design is protectable only upon a showing of secondary meaning.)
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minds of customers, the primary significance of an aesthetic feature is to
indicate the source and origin of the product. 115 One leading example is the
Christian Louboutin’s signatory “red lacquered sole.” 116 The red bottoms of
Louboutin’s shoes are protected by the trade dress doctrine, but the remainder of the shoe design is not protected for failing to establish secondary
meaning. 117 Given the fast-paced nature of the fashion industry, many fashion items are created for just one season and customers forget the old items
as soon as the new ones are released.118 Under the Act, the aesthetic features
have to be distinctive to customers and has been consistently used over time
as a source identifier. 119 Further, trademark and trade dress infringements
often require evidence of actual harm or reduced capacity of famousness of
goods sold 120 and threshold for what might constitute actionable dilution is
rather unclear. 121 Since trade dress protection requires a large amount of
expenditure and time to prove due to the need for experts and significant
advertising required, it is almost impractical for most fashion designers to
obtain. 122
B. Limitations of Design Patent Protection
(1) Substantive Requirements for Design Patents Are Burdensome to Meet
Some scholars argue that the design patent doctrine under patent law
offers a mechanism for fashion designers to acquire IP protection for their

115. See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 855, 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
116. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that Louboutin’s distinctive red lacquered soles had acquired limited secondary meaning
due to their association as a defining feature of the brand in the market and are protected as a trademark
under the trade dress doctrine.)
117. See id.
118. See Bhardwaj & Fairhurst, supra note 36, at 166-70(“Here Today, Gone Tomorrow….As fashion is considered to be a temporary cyclical phenomena adopted by consumers for a particular time, it
becomes evident that the life cycle for fashion is quite small….[F]ast fashion is viewed as a ‘waste’
because rather than buying one high quality item to satisfy a wardrobe need, consumers buy multiples
that are lower quality and then throw old merchandise away as quickly as they bring in new ones”); see
also Wilson, supra note 17, at 591-95(describing fashion trends for ready-to-wear.)
119. See Tu, supra note 90, at 431(“plaintiff must prove (1) that a distinctive mark has been used in
commerce; (2) legal or equitable ownership of the mark; and (3) that the use of a similar mark is likely to
cause confusion among consumers as to its source.”).
120. See id. at 432 (“Where infringement is established, a registrant may recover monetary damages…. However, courts will refuse to grant protection where there is no evidence of actual harm or
reduced capacity of the famous mark to identify and distinguish the goods sold.”).
121. See Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 75, 82–
96 (2014)(“ Finally, assuming away the previous two issues, policymakers and factfinders have not set a
threshold for what might constitute actionable dilution.”).
122. See Ronald Coleman, Fashion Dos: Acknowledging Social Media Evidence as Relevant to Proving Secondary Meaning, 106 Trademark Rep. 776, 776, 782 (2016).
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designs. 123 Theoretically, it does but this is very costly and time-consuming. 124Design patent doctrine provides IP protection to any “new, original
and ornamental design” of an article of manufacture 125 for a term of fifteen
years, 126 if the design is novel 127 and nonobvious. 128 These substantive
standards are often criticized as incompatible with design’s subject matter
and unduly “onerous” to meet 129 compared to copyright protection which
requires originality 130 and trademark protection which requires distinctiveness. 131 The requirement of nonobviousness 132 and ornamentality 133 are unnecessarily burdensome to fashion designers. 134 The United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) examines design patent applications for
novelty and non-obviousness through the application of an “ordinary observer” test. 135 The test asks a hypothetical ordinary observer to test the obviousness of designs over the prior art. 136 To prove novelty and non-obviousness, an examiner in a design patent case has to show that, with reference
to the prior art, an observer with ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved
would not consider the designs to be substantially the same as any prior

123. See Elizabeth Ferrill & Tina Tanhehco, Protecting the Material World: The Role of Design
Patents in the Fashion Industry, 12 N.C.J.L & Tech. 251, 277–81 (2010); see also Keeley I. Vega, A
Proposal for the Protection of Fashion Design: Knocking Off Design Patent Law, 56 J. Copyright Soc’y
U.S.A. 985, 992-95 (2009) (noting that patent protection requirements pose significant hurdles for fashion
designers in securing protection for their designs.)
124. See Vega, supra note 122, at 994.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012).
126. See id. § 173.
127. See id. § 102.
128. See id. § 103.
129. See Sarah Burstein, Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design Patents, 17 Stan. Tech.
L. Rev. 305, 310, 322-24 (2013)(“Unlike design patent protection, copyright protection arises automatically when a qualifying work is fixed in any tangible medium of expression. Copyright protection is,
therefore, instantaneous and essentially costless….This requirement (Novelty) has been repeatedly criticized. For example, Professor Afori has argued that the high standard of novelty for patents is completely
incompatible with design’s subject matter. Designs are concerned with the aesthetic appearance of products, and therefore designs are always based on parameters set by the product and prior knowledge….
The main criticism of this requirement is that it is unduly “onerous”.”).
130. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991) (defining an “original” work as the one that is independently created and exhibits a modicum of creativity of the author).
131. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (noting that anything that
identifying source can function as a trademark).
132. See generally Jason J Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design
Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 533 (2009).
133. See generally Kelsey M. Mott, The Standard of Ornamentality in the United States Design Patent Law, 48 A.B.A. J. 548 (1962).
134. See Vega, supra note 122, at 994; see also Chung, supra note 40, at 494.
135. See generally Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 174 (2015) (noting
that “[t]he ordinary observer is a hypothetical person, like the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law”) (citing
Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
136. See id.
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art. 137 Since most inspired works share some elements of a seasonal trend 138
and are often a combination of prior arts with new elements (emphasis added
that knockoffs do not add any new elements to the original designs, but inspired works do), a fashion designer of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the invention would mostly find it obvious based on their in-depth industry
insights. 139 These requirements pose a significant burden for individual fashion designers and make it almost impractical for designers to demonstrate
their designs are not already apparent in the field. 140
(2) Design Patents are Suitable for Staple items Not Seasonal Designs
Filing a design patent application can be time-consuming 141 and
costly. 142 It takes several thousand dollars and over a year for a patent to be
granted. 143 In the fashion industry, trends may develop quickly and product
life cycles could be as short as a few weeks or months. 144 The longer it takes
137. See Sarah Burstein, Is Design Patent Examination Too Lax, 33 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 607, 612
(2018)(“To prevail on a claim for infringement, the patent owner must prove that “an ordinary observer,
taking into account the prior art, would believe the accused design to be the same as the patented design.”…. If the claimed design and the relevant portion of the accused design are not plainly dissimilar,
when considered in a vacuum, the prior art can be used “to identify differences that are not noticeable in
the abstract but would be significant to the hypothetical ordinary observer familiar with the prior art.”);
see also Christopher Carani, Design Patent Lessons from Apple v Samsung, 222 MANAGING INTELL.
PROP. 32, 32(2012); see also Danielle Baudhuin, Siri v. Google: Updating the Ordinary Observer Test
for Design Patent Litigation in the United States in Response to the Apple v. Samsung Disputes, 33 WIS.
INT’L LJ 291, 313 (2015) (“The ordinary observer is capable of assessing the similarity of the patented
and accused designs in light of the similar objects in the prior art.”).
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 25 (1966); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (stating
that a patent cannot be obtained “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”); see also Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of designer Lazaro Hernandez
saying that “when designers produce basic garments that complement their original designs in their collection, we know the difference between that and what is new”).
140. See Francesca Witzburg, Protecting Fashion: A Comparative Analysis of Fashion Design Protection in the United States and the European Union, 107 TRADEMARK REP. 1131, 1134 (2017)(“Because
the United States Patent Office grants only patents for “new” designs or “new” features of designs, mere
re-workings of previously existing designs cannot obtain patent protection. And because fashion designs
often incorporate pre-existing designs, many do not qualify for design patent protection.”).
141. See Burstein, supra note 128, at 329 (“Commentators have repeatedly lamented the the long and
costly process of’ patent prosecution.”); see also Robert S Katz, Examination of Design Patent in the
United States, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109, 110–11 (2001) (noting that the USPTO may reject a
design for several reasons, potentially delaying the application process).
142. See Burstein, supra note 128, at 334 (“Critics have often argued that design patents ‘cost too
much’.”); see also Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 107, 115 (2016).
143. See Burstein, supra note 128, at 329 (“despite strenuous efforts in recent times to surmount the
backlog and accelerate the search process, it still can take eighteen months to two years before a design
patent is approved or denied.”); see also Zerbo, supra note 11, at 608; see also Christopher Buccafusco
& Fromer Jeanne, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 103-4
(2017).
144. See George Sproles, Analyzing Fashion Life Cycles - Principles and Perspectives, 45 J. MKTG.
116, 118 (1981)(quoting in footnote 3 that styles lasting only a short period, a matter of weeks or months,
are termed fads that are adopted by a small part of population.); see also Laura Fanelli, A Fashion Forward Approach to Design Protection, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 285, (2011)(“[D]esign patents have a
lengthy prior review process of approximately eighteen months, which is impractical in light of fashion’s
short life span.”); see also Vega, supra note 122, at 995 (“[The] fourteen-year term has been regarded as
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to obtain a design patent, the less value is garnered from the protection. 145
Therefore, investment in registering a design patent is usually limited to designs with a promising return on investment. 146 Design patent protection is
increasingly utilized by established brands for their staple products or bestselling goods with demonstrated longevity, particularly for high-end fashion
items such as handbags, belts, shoes, eyewear, and other accessories. 147
Established brands might have the resources to invest in registering design patents for their staple items, but small businesses and independent fashion designers do not. 148 Fashion designers would normally require immediate protection for their designs before they showcase them in a fashion show
to protect them from fast fashion retailers copying their work. 149 Since the
fashion industry is highly seasonal and a design patent can only protect the
ornamental features of a single registered design, 150 it might not be suitable
for most of the seasonal collections. By the time a patent is issued, the design
would have been exploited by multiple copyists or is no longer in fashion. 151
Furthermore, design patent protection may not be available if a design was
sold or disclosed (e.g., publicly displayed in a fashion magazine or a fashion
show) anywhere in the world more than one year prior to the date of filing
the patent application. 152 Given a design patent entails a costly and timeconsuming process, it is an unattractive investment for the vast majority of
fashion designers. 153 It would be unrealistic for fashion designers to register
every aspect of their designs and wait for a design patent to be granted because of the high risk of piracy due to mediatization. 154 In this regard, copyright protection arguably provides the most timely and cost-efficient means
of protection. 155 Nonetheless, fashion designs are currently not protectable
under copyright law. 156
inappropriate for fashion design in which the stylistic life span is one season, approximately three to six
months.”).
145. See Sarah Burstein, How Design Patent Law Lost Its Shape, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 555, 608-10
(2019); see also Vega, supra note 122, at 994-95.
146. See Ferrill & Tanhehco, supra note 122, at 292 (discussing how fashion designers can strategically obtain design patents to protect their fashion items in a cost efficient way).
147. See Ferrill & Tanhehco, supra note 122, at 277-78; see also Zerbo, supra note 11, at 608 (“While
this form of protection is being increasingly utilized by established brands for their staple products and/or
best-selling goods, it is not ideal for most fashion designs.”); see Buccafusco & Jeanne, supra note 142,
at 104-5.
148. See Buccafusco & Jeanne, supra note 142, at 104-5; see also Zerbo, supra note 11, at 608; see
also Denisse Garcia, Fashion 2.0: It’s Time for the Fashion Industry to Get Better-Suited, Custom-Tailored Legal Protection, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 237, 356 (2018).
149. See Tina Martin, Fashion Law Needs Custom Tailored Protection for Designs, 48 BALT. L. REV.
453, 473, 475 (2019).
150. See Zerbo, supra note 11, at 608.
151. See id.; see also Buccafusco & Jeanne, supra note 142, at 103-5.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012).
153. See Garcia, supra note 147, at 356; see also Zerbo, supra note 11, at 608.
154. See Janssens & Lavanga, supra note 46, at 235.
155. See Zerbo, supra note 11, at 608-09.
156. See Daniel H. Brean, Enough Is Enough: Time To Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More
Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325,
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C. Limitations of Copyright Protection
(1) Copyright Law Only Protects Separable Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Elements of a Fashion Design Not Its Entire Form
Even though there are eight categories of work of authorship currently
protected by copyright law, 157 fashion designs are deemed useful articles and
are not protected. 158 Professor David Nimmer classifies fashion designs into
two categories, namely garment designs, and fabric designs. 159 Garment design refers to the overall shape, style, cut, and dimension of a garment. 160
Fabric design refers to patterns or other two-dimensional artistic features of
a garment. 161 A pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) feature of a fashion
design, such as textile design, can be protected by copyright law if it can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the
utilitarian aspects of a design. 162 Nonetheless, most of the aesthetic features
of a fashion design are not separable from their utilitarian functions, and not
copyrightable. 163As long as they do not copy any PGS works or attach a fake
trademark onto the design, they are not infringing. Many fashion designs do
not carry PGS features, but rather a three-dimensional shape or arrangement
of details that are appealing to customers, and more importantly, fashion pirates. 164 This explains why fast-fashion retailers can blatantly copy others’
designs without much legal consequence. 165
Separating aesthetic features from utilitarian functions is difficult and
requires imagination. 166 It would be difficult for people without design training to give unbiased, consistent, and predictable judgments, and would re-

374 (2008); see also Orit F. Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1105, 1107 (2008); see also Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 123 (2018).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2020).
158. See id. at § 102.
159. See Sahara Farzaneh, Cultural Appropriation of Traditional Garment Designs in the Post-Star
Athletica Era, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 415, 432 (2019).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. 17 U.S.C. §101(2020).
163. See id. at §101(3).
164. See Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 438 (2017); see also Stover,
supra note 8, at 256.
165. See Jeanette Cuzella, Fast Fashion: A Proposal for Copyright Protection of 3D-Printed Apparel, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 369, 375-81 (2015); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 102(a)(5) (2020) (defining
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487 (2d Cir. 1960)(ruling on an infringement of textile design); see also Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that a dress with a fabric design that was overwhelmingly
similar to Unicolors’ design constituted an infringment); see also Tufenkian Imp./Export Ventures, Inc.
v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (ruling on an infringement of textile designs made
into carpets).
166. See Christopher P. Bussert, Copyright Law: A Review of the Separability Test and a Proposal
for New Design Protection, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 59, 74-88 (1983).
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quire judges to identify physical or conceptually separable copyrightable elements 167 For many years, courts are split over the issue of whether an aesthetic feature of a design can be separated from its utilitarian function on
either a physical or a conceptual basis.168 Since the enactment of the Copyright Act in 1976, courts have applied at least nine different approaches to
interpret whether a design element is separately identifiable and capable of
independent existence. 169 Some courts within the same circuit even held different views and could not come up with consistent results to protect the
authors of their useful articles that contained aesthetic features. 170 As the
Sixth Circuit alluded to in its judgment, the problem with these various types
of approach is that focusing on aesthetic features often relies upon a judge’s
artistic taste and is based entirely on conjecture.171 Scholars have also criticized approaches that require judges to make aesthetic judgments as part of
their legal analysis. This is against the Court’s longstanding admonition that
judges should not be art critics. 172
(2) Application of Star Athletica in Protecting Fashion Designs is Uncertain and Might Lead to Another Decade of Diverted Interpretations
In Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, SCOTUS sought to unify the nine
conflicting approaches and develop a more uniform two-pronged separability test for lower courts to apply. 173 The Court held that §101 of the Copyright Act does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functional
useful article once the design element has been imaginatively separated from
it. 174 An aesthetic feature of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection if it (i) can be perceived as a two or three-dimensional work of art separated from the useful article, and (ii) would qualify as a protectable PGS
work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from
the useful article. 175 Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that the protection
extends only to surface design and does not cover the shape, cut, style, or

167. See id. at 82-88.
168. See id. at 69-88.
169. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 779 F.3d 468, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing
at least nine notable approaches applied by various courts to determine separability, including (1) the
Copyright Office approach, (2) the Objectively Necessary approach, (3) the Stand-Alone approach, (4)
the Ordinary Observer approach, (5) the Design-Process approach, (6) the Primary-Subsidiary approach,
(7) the Likelihood-of-Marketability approach, (8) the Patry’ approach, and (9) the Subjective-Objective
approach.)
170. See Bussert, supra note 165, at 74-88; see also Tyler T. Ochoa, What Is a Useful Article in
Copyright Law after Star Athletica, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 109 (2017).
171. See Varsity Brands, Inc., 799 F.3d at 484-85 (citing Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416
F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005)).
172. See Cassandra Baloga, Copyright & Fashion: The Shoe That Does Not Fit, 64 NYL SCH. L.
REV. 265, 274-75 (2019).
173. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
174. See id. at 1014.
175. See id. at 1016.
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dimension to the uniform. 176 When the utilitarian and PGS features of a useful article are intertwined, courts should not give copyright protection to the
work. 177
At first glance, Star Athletica seems to be a precedent for how fashion
designs might be protected by copyright law. 178 Nonetheless, Scholars commented that fabric design protection was well-established long before Star
Athletica, 179 and Star Athletica did not provide any additional copyright protection to fashion designs. 180 The Court emphasized several times that Varsity Brands had no right to prohibit anyone from making a plain, unadorned
cheerleading uniform of that shape without the patterns. 181 The Court did not
further provide any descriptive analysis of the separability test. 182 Justice
Thomas acknowledged the line between art and design is hard to draw, especially when industrial designs incorporates artistic elements 183 He reiterated that courts should not give any artistic judgment. 184 Justice Breyer also
in his dissent commented that if extending copyright to artistic features to
the useful article itself when those features are not truly conceptually separable, then virtually any industrial design could be thought of separately as a
work of art. 185 Scholars opined that the Court intended to ensure that the
lower court judges would not give any aesthetic preferences and that the test
was aesthetically neutral and implementable. 186
In an empirical study, scholars compared the court decisions that have
emerged from Star Athletica, and found that judges continue to struggle in
determining copyrightable elements of a useful article following this
SCOTUS decision. 187 Justice Breyer’s dissent in application of the new separability test further hints that lower courts may likely create and contend
with even more varying interpretations of the same test going forward.188
Professor Rebecca Tushnet also opined that this Star Athletica announced
176. See id.
177. See Trenton Davis, A Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court’s New Separability Test in Star
Athletica, 33 BERKELEY TECH. LJ 1091, 1114 (2018); see also David Shipley, All for Copyright Stand up
and Holler: Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the US Supreme Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 151 (2018).
178. See generally Ochoa, supra note 169.
179. See Zerbo, supra note 11, at 609; see also Shipley, supra note 176, at 163, 165-67; see also
Farzaneh, supra note 158, at 432 and 433.
180. See Baloga, supra note 171, at 273, 279.
181. See Star Athletica,137 S. Ct. at 1006, 1013.
182. See Angelo Marchesini, Thin Separability: An Answer to Star Athletica, 43 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1087, 1094-96 (2019).
183. See Star Athletica,137 S. Ct. at 1008.
184. See id. at 1015.
185. See id. at 1018.
186. See Federal Statutes and Regulations, 131 HARV. L. REV. 363, 369, 372 (2017); see also Philip
Duclos, Three Cheers for Trekonomics: The Future of Copyright Doctrine according to Star Athletica
and Star Trek, 27 CORNELL JL & PUB. POL’Y 207, 231 (2017).
187. See Daan G Erikson, Copyright Protection for Conceptually Separable Artistic Features PostStar Athletica: A Useful Article on Useful Articles, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 56, 58-62 (2019).
188. See Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 185, at 372.
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only abstract principles that are internally inconsistent and generally unhelpful in dealing with three-dimensional works. 189 In coming years, lower courts
will face more challenges in applying the test and create another morass of
tests similar to the useful article doctrine’s legal landscape before Star Athletica. 190 It will result in as much unpredictability as this cases preceding Star
Athletica from an aesthetic perspective, 191 and brings us from one imaginative abstract to another. 192 It is difficult for judges without much design training to follow, 193 and as much as for fashion designers to assess whether their
designs could be protected by copyright law. 194 It is essential to amend copyright law to clarify the scope of protectable fashion items and infringement
standards. 195 In this regard, the IDPA offers a well-thought-out solution. 196

Figure 3: Comparison between Halston’s dress (left) and Calvin Klein’s
version (right).
III. PARADOX OF THE “PIRACY PARADOX” DOCTRINE
Although IP laws in the United States provide limited protection to
fashion designs, Professors Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman argue
that such “low IP equilibrium” does not hinder creativity, but instead helps
the fashion industry thrive. 197 They describe the phenomenon as, fashion pi189. See Rebecca Tushnet, Shoveling a Path After Star Athletica, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1216, 1218,
1222, 1239 (2019).
190. See Barton Beebe, Star Athletica and the Problem of Panaestheticism, 9 UC IRVINE L. REV.
275, 294-97 (2018).
191. See Davis, supra note 176, at 1092, 1114; see also Soucek, supra note 163, at 451.
192. See Baloga, supra note 171, at 277; see also Federal Statutes and Regulations, supra note 185,
at 368; see also Davis, supra note 176, at 1105-6.
193. See Soucek, supra note 163, at 447-48; see also Shipley, supra note 176, at 151; see also Federal
Statutes and Regulations, supra note 185, at 372.
194. See Baloga, supra note 171, at 279; see also Davis, supra note 176, at 1091; see also Figure 3.
195. See id.
196. See infra Part V.
197. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1745–59.
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racy, and proposed the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine in 2006; the “Piracy Paradox” became a dominant view in the literature for opposing any extension of
copyright protection to fashion designs. 198 Sprigman was invited to testify
before the Subcommittee in opposition of the IDPPPA based on the “Piracy
Paradox” doctrine, and Congress subsequently rejected the bill. 199 The doctrine asserts that copying is beneficial to fashion designers as it helps develop
fashion trends and accelerate the extinction of these trends which, ultimately,
incentivizes fashion designers to create more and more quickly. 200 Enhanced
IP protection for fashion designs will indeed be harmful to the industry. 201
Nonetheless, I would argue that these assertions are unsupported by any evidential data and represent a biased perception of today’s fashion industry. 202
Harnandez also argues that the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine is similar to the
argument that stealing boosts Gross National Product as owners have to replace their lost property. 203
A. Are Fashion Designers Not Incentivized to Lobby for Changes in Copyright Law?
The fundamental reasoning of the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine is based
on the “incentive theory.” 204 The theory suggests that if extensive copying
will destroy fashion designers’ incentives to create, there should not be as
many fashion collections released in each season as there currently are.205 As
fashion companies continue to rapidly produce new works, the theory asserts
that copying fails to deter innovation in the fashion industry—because it is
not detrimental to fashion designers—and hence fashion designers are not
incentivized to lobby for changes in the law. 206 Raustiala and Sprigman further claim that copying is often celebrated as “homage” rather than “piracy.” 207

198. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Faster Fashion: The Piracy Paradox and Its Perils,
39 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ 536, 536-37 (2021).
199. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39 (statement of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of Virginia Law School).
200. See Stover, supra note 8, at 259.
201. See Stover, supra note 8, at 258.
202. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1720 (“[T]he diffusion of cheap, obviously inferior
copies may tarnish by association the original article, although whether originals are in fact “tarnished”
by copies is an empirical question on which there is little research.”).
203. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 7 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
204. See Chung, supra note 40, at 494; see also Stover, supra note 8, at 256-57.
205. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1688–89 (“Nonetheless, the industry develops a
tremendous variety of clothing and accessory designs at a rapid pace. This is a puzzling outcome.”).
206. See id. at 1691 (“[C]opying fails to deter innovation in the fashion industry because, counterintuitively, copying is not very harmful to originators. Indeed, copying may actually promote innovation
and benefit originators.”).
207. See id. at 1691 (“Design copying is occasionally complained about, but it is as often celebrated
as “homage” as it is attacked as “piracy.”).
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Raustiala and Sprigman assume that the amount of fashion designs released in each season is evidences that fashion designers are motivated.208
This assumption ignores the fact that the majority of fashion items are produced only by a few leading fashion houses; many other struggling fashion
designers, like Roberts or Nice, are struggling because they are unable to
recoup their investments in designs, or are even being forced to give up their
dreams. 209 It may be a bit arbitrary to conclude copying is not harmful to
fashion designers based on the scholars’ observations of no obvious decline
of innovation output. Raustiala and Sprigman admit that there is little research that could support their assertions on creative output. 210 There are different types of fashion designs, i.e., haute couture, ready-to-wear, sportswear, fast fashion, tailor-made, costume and many others. 211 While Raustiala
and Sprigman could be right that some fashion retailers such as fast fashion
and ready-to-wear retailers might not be incentivized to lobby for changing
the law because “low-IP equilibrium” benefits them, it is improper to conclude that copying is not harmful to all fashion designers. 212
B. Misunderstanding of Fashion Trend Formation
The “Piracy Paradox” further asserts that unregulated copying and the
“low-IP equilibrium” help the industry establish trends, which is referred to
as “anchoring.” 213 Raustiala and Sprigman explain that based on the zeitgeist
theory (a traditional fashion theory), fashion designers follow other designers’ leads each season, by an undirected process of copying, referencing, and
testing design themes that eventually convey to customers what is “in fashion.” 214 Raustiala and Sprigman assume that all fashion designers are in some
sense copyists and quoted a case held in 1918 to suggest that contemporary

208. See Stover, supra note 8, at 261-62.
209. See Sheng Lu, “Made in the USA” Textiles and Apparael - Key Production and Export Trends,
JUSTSTYLE (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.just-style.com/analysis/made-in-the-usa-textiles-and-apparelkey-production-and-export-trends_id138013.aspx [perma.cc/2J2C-28EL]; see also Scott Hemphill &
Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1716 (2008); see also
Katherine Felice, Fashioning a Solution for Design Piracy: Considering Intellectual Property Law in the
Global Context of Fast Fashion, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 219, 230 (2011).
210. See infra Part III.D; see also Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1720.
211. See JENNY LANTZ, DESIGNS, BRANDS AND TRENDS—TO LEAVE A MARK, IN THE
TRENDMAKERS: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE GLOBAL FASHION INDUSTRY, 89–136 (2018).
212. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1733 (“[E]xistence of identifiable trends is itself a
product of pervasive design copying and that the creation and accelerated extinction of these trends helps
to sell fashion.”).
213. See id. at 1728.
214. See id. at 1732.
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fashion designs are still “free as the air to common use.” 215 I find their understanding of what constitutes a fashion trend might be one-dimensional. 216
While fashion designers get their inspiration from various sources, this
does not lead them to blatantly copy. There are many resources where designers often find their own style of presentations. 217 In The Law, Culture,
and Economics of Fashion, Professors Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk—
who were also invited to testify before the Subcommittee in favor of the
IDPPPA—rightly pointed out that Raustiala and Sprigman failed to differentiate between copying and referencing. 218 Line-by-line copying does not
promote innovation, but rather creates substitutions while inspired works
push potential trends to emerge. 219 Raustiala and Sprigman might be right
that fashion designers are inspired by “runway trends,” but they do not blatantly copy others’ designs. 220 Copying does not create trends; it hinders
trend development. Near identical knockoffs do not add any creative value
to an existing trend. 221 Rather, I would argue that they are clones rather than
new species of a genus that “serve flocking but not differentiation.” 222 Imagine a fashion show of knockoffs and original designs; we will not see a trend
but rather a collection of “counterfeits without fake trademarks” and the respective “originals.” 223 As Professor Mark Brewer who cited Professor Barton Beebe’s example in the diamond industry saying that “an abundance of
persuasive imitations over time will erode the perceived rarity of diamonds”
and so are the harms caused by knock-offs which in essence will dilute the
market of the originals. 224
Fashion trends are shaped by various design elements such as color,
shape, material, trim, pattern, etc. 225 Trendy fashion designs carry common
elements of a current trend. 226 Fashion designers create trendy designs by
mixing fashionable elements with their own creative styles. 227 They contribute their creative expressions to the industry and find it satisfying both ca-

215. See id. at 1705 (“The practice of designers and design firms copying one another is equally
common…. These “runway trends,” of course, are the works of other designers.”); see also id. at 1716
(citing Societe Yves Saint Laurent Couture S.A. v. Societe Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt. S.A., [1994]
E.C.C. 512, 514 (Trib. Comm. (Paris)) and quoting that fashion designs are “free as the air to common
use.”).
216. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 205 (providing a contextual model of clothing sign system).
217. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1164–68.
218. See id. at 1174.
219. See id. at 1175.
220. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1705.
221. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1174–80.
222. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1153.
223. See Martin, supra note 148, at 456; see also Stover, supra note 8, at 260-261.
224. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809,
833 (2010); see also Brewer, supra note 14, at 762.
225. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 170.
226. See id. at 172–75.
227. See id. at 175–80.
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reer-wise and self-fulfilment-wise when their styles are recognized and honored. 228 Fashion shows provide an opportunity for them to identify trendy
elements. 229 Unlike fast fashion retailers, fashion designers do not “appropriate” others’ designs. 230 In contrast, they incorporate their own elements to
create their own inspired works. 231 Raustiala and Sprigman’s statement,
“freedom to copy is taken for granted at all levels of the fashion world”
proves misleading. 232 It may be true for fashion designers who are hired by
fast-fashion retailers to copy other brands’ products and minimize design
costs. 233 Doubtfully any fashion designer would be proud of being a “copycat.” 234 While “anchoring” is essential to convey fashion trends to customers,
it does not rely on unethical copying but rather relies on healthy referencing. 235 Paris, France, one of the world’s biggest fashion capitals, possesses
arguably the most well-known fashion designers and design techniques. 236 Today, French fashion designers often set fashion trends and inspire the rest of the global design industry. Strong IP protection provided by
French copyright law does not seem to affect fashion trend formation in
France, nor does it hinder innovation as claimed by the “Piracy Paradox”
doctrine. 237
C. Obsolete Definition of Fashion
Raustiala and Sprigman’s definition of fashion is obsolete. They construe fashion items as status-conferring goods 238 based on the status theory
and propose that unregulated copying accelerates the diffusion of fashion
trends and styles. 239 They describe this phenomenon as “induced obsolescence.” 240 As copying erodes the positional qualities of fashion items, early

228. See id. at 212–13.
229. See id.
230. See generally EUNDEOK KIM ET AL., FASHION TRENDS: ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING (2021).
231. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 6 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
232. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1716.
233. See Zerbo, supra note 11, at 622; see also Brewer, supra note 14, at 760.
234. See Marie Roure, Fashion Copycats, FASHION COPYCATS, (Mar. 22, 2021, 8:01pm),
https://fashioncopycats.com/ [https://perma.cc/4JPH-5HT5]; see also Adler & Jeanne, supra note 6, at
1479-80; see also Jared Schroeder & Camille Kraeplin, Give Me a C: Refashioning the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Star Athletica v. Varsity into an Art-First Approach to Copyright Protection for Fashion
Designers, 26 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 19, 25-6 (2018).
235. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1153; see also Chung, supra note 40, at 501-2.
236. See generally VALERIE STEELE, PARIS FASHION: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2017).
237. See Kaitlyn Pytlak, The Devil Wears Fraud-a: An Aristotelian-Randian Approach to Intellectual
Property Law in the Fashion Industry, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. LJ 273, 295 (2015); see also Susan Scafidi,
Intellectual property and fashion design, 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115,
116-18, 126 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006).
238. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1727 (“While some runway fashion can indeed
induce nausea, we think it is the positional nature of fashion as a status-conferring good rather than any
abstract aesthetic principle that drives the fashion cycle.”).
239. See id. at 1724.
240. See id. at 1718.

2022

STOP GLORIFYING FASHION PIRACY

189

adopter consumers seek out new designs and propel the fashion cycle. 241
Hence, fashion piracy is paradoxically beneficial to fashion designers as it
induces more rapid turnover and additional sales. 242 They contend that if
copying were illegal, fashion cycles will be slowed. 243 These assertions are
dubious, and the application of the status theory to all levels of fashion designs may be too simplistic. 244 Historically, fashion was once a process of
emulation by which new fashion designs pass from upper-class people to the
lower; and through this descent, a new fashion cycle starts. 245 This is also
known as the trickle-down theory invented by Veblen in 1899. 246 Scholars
have created new fashion theories: for example, trickle-across theory (where
fashion moves horizontally between groups on similar social levels) and
trickle-up theory (where innovation flows from lower-income groups to upper-income groups). 247 These theories beg the question of whether fashion
items should still be considered as merely status-conferring products and
perhaps might only be relevant in the prestigious high-end fashion market. 248
While some fashion items, particularly those designed by high-end
fashion brands, allow customers to signal their status and confer prestige,
many items do not (i.e., ready-to-wear, sportswear). 249 At the time of this
writing, there is no empirical research conducted to examine the correlation
between the fashion cycle pace and unregulated copying. Raustiala and
Sprigman have yet provided any supporting data in their article either. 250 The
evidentiary data certainly does not show how individual fashion designers
like Roberts, who designs day-to-day casual wear and baby dresses, will benefit from this “induced obsolescence” argument, and why unregulated copying will induce additional sales for her either. Further, fashion designs receive better protection in Europe and the fashion cycle is comparable to the
American fashion cycle. 251 Raustiala and Sprigman are aware of the lack of
evidence to prove whether the value of originals is tarnished by knockoffs. 252

241. See id. at 1722.
242. See id. (“[P]iracy paradoxically benefits designers by inducing more rapid turnover and additional sales.”).
243. See id. (“[I]f copying were illegal, the fashion cycle would occur very slowly.”).
244. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1157; see also Chung, supra note 40, at 500; see also
Stover, supra note 8, at 262.
245. See Chung, supra note 40, at 495, 500.
246. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1156.
247. See MARILYN DELONG, THEORIES OF FASHION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLOTHING AND FASHION
(2005).
248. See Chung, supra note 40, at 500, 528, 582.
249. See generally Fred Davis, Fashion, culture, and identity (2013).
250. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1201, 1212 (2009) (“[G]iven this dynamic and in the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary, there
is no compelling reason to distinguish between line-by-line copies and derivative reworkings for the purposes of differentiation and flocking.”).
251. See Witzburg, supra note 139, at 1141-47.
252. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1720.
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Without supporting data, their claim might be theoretically plausible but detached from current reality.
D. Empirical Research Should be Conducted to Understand Industry’s
Preference
Raustiala and Sprigman infer the industry’s acceptance of piracy from
the prevailing silence. 253 They compare the attitude of the fashion industry
towards piracy with the music industry, suggesting that the lack of vigorous
legislative and litigation campaigns from fashion designers implies that copying does not harm them. 254 Public choice theory, however, suggests that
individuals may assess the costs and benefits, and ultimately determine it is
not worth to take legal action against the infringers. 255 Nonetheless, stagnation does not equal indifference. Fashion designers Peggy Noland and Seth
Bogart reveal that they cannot afford to sue fast-fashion retailers who make
large profits by copying their designs. 256 They would rather spend their
money creating their next designs than pursue a costly and timely lawsuit. 257
The Arts of Fashion Foundation initiated an online petition in 2009 to enlist
support from the public to stop fashion piracy. 258 Furthermore, in 2011 (five
years after the publication of the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine, in 2006), the
CFDA and the American Apparel & Footwear Association (AAFA) both testified before the Subcommittee in favor of the IDPPPA. 259 A growing number of fashion designers are voicing opposition against fashion piracy. 260
Even if Raustiala and Sprigman’s assertions were once correct it appears that
we can no longer assume that unregulated copying benefits fashion designers.
Raustiala and Sprigman admit in their paper that without knowing the
business strategies of individual firms they cannot predict whether a low-IP
253. See id. at 1691 (“[D]espite these exhortations, the fashion industry itself is surprisingly quiescent about copying…they largely appear to accept appropriation of designs as a fact of life.”).
254. See id. at 1691 (“[T]his diffidence stands in striking contrast to the heated condemnation of
piracy - and associated vigorous legislative and litigation campaigns in other creative industries. In Congress, these industries have sought broader and more durable IP protections through new laws.”); see also
id. at 1717 (“In the courts, they have aggressively fought alleged pirates and their enablers….The fashion
industry, in comparison, has done none of these things.”).
255. See id. at 1695 (“Public choice theory may provide an alternative explanation for fashion’s lowIP regime: perhaps the low-IP regime persists because the various fashion industry players, unlike those
in film or music, cannot effectively organize to press their case before Congress.”).
256. See Anna Colon, Two Artists Opened A Pop-Up Shop Filled With Fast-Fashion Rip-Offs,
REFINERY 29 (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2016/10/128088/wacky-wacko-popup-shop-zara-fast-fashion-knockoffs [https://perma.cc/4868-HWW4].
257. See id.
258. See Online Petition, ARTS OF FASHION FOUNDATION (Mar. 22, 2021), http://www.arts-of-fashion.org/stopdesignpiracy.html [https://perma.cc/LTQ6-LMYT].
259. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39 (statements of representatives of CFDA and AAFA).
260. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1183-84; see also Giselle Defares, Lines Blur With
Inspiration and Theft, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/07/who-owns-fashion/lines-blur-with-inspiration-and-theft
[https://perma.cc/V7A3C2EE].
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equilibrium benefits these firms or not. 261 Nonetheless, their “Piracy Paradox” doctrine is founded on their assumptions and predictions of fashion
trends. 262 In 2009, Raustiala and Sprigman revisited the “Piracy Paradox”
doctrine, and maintained their assertions of induced obsolescence and anchoring. 263 Nevertheless, they admit that there is no compelling evidence to
support their arguments. 264 In contrast, they counter-argue that Hemphill and
Suk’s proposition that low-IP equilibrium harms small fashion brands and
individual designers is lacking empirical support either. 265 They maintain
their position that extending copyright protection to fashion designs is likely
to harm more than help new or small fashion brands. 266 In conclusion, they
agree that even though they are skeptical that fashion designers’ preferences
are likely to coincide with social welfare, it is helpful to know what industry
preferences are. 267
A wealth of academic literature has developed in response to Sprigman
and Suk’s divergent propositions. 268 However, these propositions have yet
261. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1758 (“We cannot predict without knowing more
about the business strategies of individual firms whether a particular retailer would prefer a low-IP environment in which product differentiation in fashion is limited to brands or a higher-IP environment in
which retailers differentiate not just via brands, but also designs.”).
262. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 249, at 1213 (“[P]ersuasive evidence for this proposition
is lacking. Until we see such evidence, Congress should let well enough alone.”).
263. See id. at 1200(“[C]opying, in other words, signals a trend, solidifies it, and then exhausts it.”).
264. See id. at 1212 (“[I]ndeed, there is no compelling evidence that copying, whether close or not,
has produced systematic harm for the industry.”).
265. See id. at 1211 (“[W]e are very skeptical of this argument. First, Hemphill and Suk have raised
empirical questions-do fashion consumers lifecycle price…do they do so effectively?. . .but they offer no
evidence in favor of their claims.”); see also id. at 1214 (“[B]ut for the differentiation concept to have
more purchase as a normative construct, we need to know at what level consumers differentiate. The Law,
Culture, and Economics of Fashion does not offer much evidence about this issue (nor have we seen
evidence presented elsewhere).”).
266. See id. at 1221(“[B]ut more importantly, extending copyright is likely to harm, not help, new or
small designers. Relatively unknown and poorly funded entrants are at a disadvantage, relative to a rich
and well-known incumbent.”).
267. See id. at 1223 (“That said, even if we are skeptical that the designers’ preferences are likely to
coincide with social welfare, it may nonetheless be helpful to know what industry preferences are.”).
268. See generally Robin M. Nagel, Tailoring Copyright to Protect Artists: Why the United States
Needs More Elasticity in Its Protection for Fashion Designs, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 635 (2020); see also
Lauren E. Purcell, A Fashion Flop: The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act,
31 J.L. & COM. 207 (2012-2013); see also David Reap, A Proposal for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Process for the Fashion Industry after the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act,
13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 621 (2012); see also Katelyn N. Andrews, The Most Fascinating Kind
of Art: Fashion Design Protection as a Moral Right, 2 NYU J. INTELL.. PROP. & ENT. L. 188 (2012); see
also Brittany West, A New Look for the Fashion Industry: Redesigning Copyright Law with the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA), 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 57
(2011); see also Emma Xiao, The New Trend: Protecting American Fashion Designs through National
Copyright Measures, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (2010); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Gilles
Grolleau & Sana El Harbi, The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets,
39 J. LEGAL. STUD. 159 (2010); see also Silvia Beltrametti, Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition
Act: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease - An Analogy with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the
Protection Available in the European Community, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147 (2010); see also
Sara R. Ellis, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of Fashion Design Protection and Why the DPPA
and IDPPPA are a Step towards the Solution to Counterfeit Chic, 78 TENN. L. REV. 163 (2010); see also
Shayne Adler, Pirating the Runway: The Potential Impact of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act on Fashion Retail, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 381 (2009); see also Joseph E. McNamara, Modifying the Design Piracy
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to be supported with evidence. In 2017, Sprigman emphasized that “the most
interesting question will be answered in the coming decades, when the empirical scholarship on copyright and creative incentives matures.” 269 He
urges scholars who are interested in the deep empirics of copyright to conduct varied empirical studies to provide a clearer picture of how much copyright is required to motivate creativity. 270
Without further evidence, this “Piracy Paradox” doctrine is now in a
deadlock where parties of both sides will keep making similar arguments
without investigating what the society perceives through any empirical studies in the United States. 271 Empirical data on fashion designers’ incentives
and social norms on American fashion culture seems to be the most crucial
yet missing piece of the puzzle of this fashion piracy debate. 272 Further empirical research is necessary before presenting more persuasive arguments,
bolstered with data, to Congress. 273
IV. COMPATIBILITY OF IDPA WITH COPYRIGHT THEORIES
In the past fifteen years, there have been multiple bills proposed to Congress to amend the Copyright Act to provide sui generis protection to fashion
designs. 274 From the proposed amendments in each of the attempts, we can
see that activists have narrowed down the scope of protection as much as
possible, 275 so that fashion designers can seek inspiration without the chilling
Prohibition Act to Offer Opt-Out Protection for Fashion Designs, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 505
(2009); see also Elizabeth F. Johnson, Defining Fashion - Interpreting the Scope of the Design Piracy
Prohibition Act, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 729 (2008); see also Lynsey Blackmon, The Devil Wears Prado: A
Look at the Design Piracy Prohibition Act and the Extension of Copyright Protection to the World of
Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107 (2007); see also Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress
Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305
(2007); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 99, at 127-29; see also Martin, supra note 148, at 456; see also
Tan, supra note 26, at 893-95; see also Hedrick, supra note 96, at 215-17.
269. .See Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (and Don’t), 55
HOUS. L. REV. 451, 478 (2017) ( “[w]e need better access to data, which is usually proprietary. And those
of us who do empirical research on the link between copyright and creativity need to do more to attract
talent into the field. The question of what spurs creativity is of surpassing importance to human life. It’s
a scandal we know as little about it as we do.”).
270. See id.
271. See Duclos, supra note 185, at 214-16.
272. See Sprigman, supra note 268, at 455, 478; see also Brewer, supra note 14, at 758.
273. See id.
274. See Scafidi, supra note 236, at 118-21 (outlining past legal efforts to obtain copyright protection
for fashion designs).
275. See Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006) (In 2006, Representative
Robert Goodlatte introduced a bill to include fashion designs in the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act as
a protected form of design. The bill defined fashion designs as the ornamental appearance of an article of
apparel and asked for a three year of protection. In 2007, Representative William Delahunt proposed
another version of the bill clarified that making, selling, importing, and distributing by anyone without
knowledge that the design might have already existed or belonged to another will not constitute any infringement); see also Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA), H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009) (In 2009,
Representative William Delahunt introduced a third modified version of the DPPA. The revised bill proposed to include fashion designs as articles of apparel under the definition of “useful article” in the Copyright Act, which includes clothing, handbags, purses, wallets, eyeglass frames and many other fashion
items. In the revised version, Registration within six months of design’s publication was added to the bill.
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effect of frivolous lawsuits. 276 Although concessions were made, none of
these attempts were successful. 277 The latest attempt was the IDPA proposed
by Senator Charles Schumer in 2012. 278 The following section will explain
why the IDPA is a well-thought-out bill that can maximize the welfare of the
public, provide a balanced yet fair solution for fashion designers to protect
their designs, and allow for copyists and customers to utilize the works.
A. Welfare Theory
The most influential and predominant theory that shapes the copyright
law regime in the United States is the welfare theory. 279 The theory grows
out of utilitarianism on which the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine is based. 280 It
aims to maximize social welfare by striking a balance between (i) incentivizing creators by giving them enough exclusive rights to continue to create
and (ii) making these rights limited enough so that the public can utilize these
creative works. 281 Opponents of copyright protection for fashion designs often assert that copyright protection will deprive the public’s right to buy affordable fashion. This assertion violates the principle of the welfare theory.
The first limb of the theory is to give the creators enough exclusive rights to
continue to create and then the law can limit the extent that others can use
the works. 282 Allowing the public to utilize the works is not the only factor,
and immediately available for use is not a consideration either. To balance
the incentives for creators and general welfare, the Constitution construed
this to include two major factors: (i) to allow the public access to the products
of the creator’s genius after a limited period of exclusive control has expired,
A searchable electronic database contains visual representation of all registered fashion designs and their
registration status would be available to the public if the law were enacted. The proposed standard of
infringement was higher which required the infringing designs to be closely and substantially similar in
the overall visual appearance of the original design to constitute an infringement. The DPPA once again
failed to become law); see also Innovative Design Prevention and Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 3728, 111th
Cong. (2010) (In 2010, Senator Charles Schumer proposed the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy
Prevention Act (IDPPPA). Most of the provisions of the IDPPPA were similar to those proposed by the
DPPA, but the new bill further heightened the standard of originality by requiring a fashion design to
carry a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial, and non-utilitarian variation over prior fashion designs, and
must be the result of a designer’s original and independent creation. The IDPPPA set an even higher
standard for proving infringement by requiring that an item be “substantially identical” in overall visual
appearance to the original elements of a protected design. Nonetheless, the IDPPPA had taken out the
registration requirement but stipulated that registration was required in an infringement action. Again,
this bill failed to generate any further action and did not move forward).
276. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39 (statement of Kurt Courtney, manager of government
relations at the AAFA testified in front of the Subcommittee suggesting that the IDPA is a targeted approach).
277. See Ellis, supra note 267, at 170-73 (2010).
278. See Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012)[hereinafter IDPA S.
3523].
279. See William W. Fisher, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 21-27 (2007).
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id.
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and (ii) to reward the owner. 283 Copyright law should not be one-sided and
only protect the public’s interest (in fact the copyists’ interests) to utilize the
works. The IDPA indeed provides limited protection for fashion designs
against close copying while allowing the public to utilize fashion designs to
create inspired works. 284 Copyists can either wait until the three-year term of
protection expires or create an inspired work instead. They are not obliged
to copy the entire work.
Fashion designs embrace a broad range of creative items. 285 Many of
them are “public goods” that are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. 286 Particularly in this technological and social media era, once fashion designers
make their designs available to the public, it is very difficult for them to prevent copyists from gaining access to them. 287 The fashion design process involves a large amount of investment of time and money. 288 Fast fashion retailers can easily knock off fashion designers’ works and sell them cheaply
in the market within weeks if not days. 289 If fast fashion retailers were free
to copy fashion designs without compensating the original designers, fashion
designers would arguably lose their motivation to continue their creative efforts. 290 They will see a disproportionate effect on their profitability and
hence are discouraged from innovating. 291 Without adequate protection for
their works, burgeoning fashion designers might curtail their careers if they
fail to earn a living. 292 The public will be the ultimate loser and be deprived
of the right to utilize creative fashion designs these talents would have made
but for the fashion piracy. 293
The IP clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for

283. See Chung, supra note 40, at 531; see also Zerbo, supra note 11, at 596; see also Adler & Jeanne,
supra note 6, at 1494-95.
284. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1184-90.
285. See generally VERONICA MANLOW, DESIGNING CLOTHES: CULTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE FASHION INDUSTRY (2009).
286. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 18-22 (2009).
287. See Chung, supra note 40, at 495, 519.
288. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that “it
takes tens of thousands of dollars to start a business and even more to sustain it….The cost of a typical
show is approximately $320,000….a significant amount of money has been spent before a designer has
received their first order”); see also Sponsiello, supra note 17, at 43-53.
289. See Zerbo, supra note 11, at 598.
290. See Stover, supra note 8, at 258; see also Mala Chatterjee, Conceptual Separability as Conceivability: a Philosophical Analysis of the Useful Articles Doctrine, 93 NYUL REV. 558, 586 (2018).
291. See Doucet, supra note 1(stating that “one of the challenges for the American fashion industry
as well as for the design education resides in the adoption of a copyright law for fashion design. Even if
the passing of such a law can only help to end the productions of copycats and to diminish the piracy
industry, young professionals will access to the creative positions that they deserve and to be recognized
for their work.”); see also generally Lieber, supra note 50.
292. See Tom W. Bell, Author’s Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 235-42 (2003).
293. See Buccafusco & Jeanne, supra note 142, at 76.
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limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 294 To promote innovation, fashion designers
must have assurance that they will benefit from their designs. 295 Congress
should extend sui generis copyright protection to fashion designs to protect
fashion designers’ incentives to create while not stifling competition or impeding creative progress in the industry. 296 In view of the fast-paced and dynamic nature of the fashion industry, sui generis protection would be suitable
for fashion designs and Congress had passed similar protections before for
architecture, 297 vessel hulls, 298 and semiconductor chips. 299 Scafidi and other
scholars contended that this limited form of sui generis copyright protection
is well suited to the dynamics of the fashion industry and would best preserve
innovation than any other kind of IP protection available for fashion designs
in the United States. 300
The IDPA is a balanced approach to provide basic but essential protection for fashion designs with a limited term of three years 301 such that the
fashion designers can be rewarded to create while not limiting others to access their works except for line-by-line copies. 302 Three years of protection
is much less than the standard lifetime of copyright 303 and the duration of sui
generis protections available for other designs such as vessel hull. 304 Due to
the rapidly moving fashion cycle, most fashion designers do not require an
extended year of protection. 305 Although some scholars suggest that the first
three years of creation are when fashion designers can generate the most
profits from their designs, 306 the actual time for fashion designers to recoup

294. U.S. Const.. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
295. See Bell, supra note 291, at 244-51.
296. See John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu, Competition Law and Copyright Misuse, 56 DRAKE L. REV.
427, 433-37 (2008).
297. See Raphael Winick, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 Duke L. J. 1598, 1604-08 (1991); See also Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-06, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
298. See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-304, §§ 501-02, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332).
299. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-620, § 301, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14).
300. See Stover, supra note 8, at 264; see also Beltrametti, supra note 267, at 158; see also Xiao,
supra note 267, at 436.
301. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(d).
302. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1184-1190.
303. .7 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2020).
304. See id. at § 1305(a) (giving vessel hulls up to a term of ten years copyright protection.)
305. See Sproles, supra note 143, at 116-24.
306. See Sproles, supra note 143, at 118 (This period will allow designers time to develop their ideas
in consultation with influential editors and buyers prior to displaying the work to the general public,
followed by a year of exclusive sales as part of the designer’s experimental signature line, and another
year to develop diffusion lines or other mass-market sales); see also Susanna Monseau, European Design
Rights: A Model for the Protection of all Designers from Piracy, 48 AM. BUS. LJ 27, 71-2 (2011); see
also Jasmine Martinez, Intellectual Property Rights & Fashion Design: An Expansion of Copyright Protection, 53 USFL REV. 369, 391 (2019).
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their investments depends on the types of work they create. 307 Some fashion
designers may need more time to recoup than others, such as bridal dress
fashion designers. 308 Three years of protection is generally long enough to
protect fashion designers from piracy, but not too long where it may hinder
innovation or slow down the fashion cycle. 309 Furthermore, the IDPA limits
the protection for fashion designs that are created through independent creative endeavors and are “unique, distinguishable, non-trivial, and non-utilitarian.” 310 The IDPA specially excludes certain fashion designs from protection
if they are embodied in a useful article that is made public more than three
years before the date upon which copyright protection is asserted. 311
The IDPA targets only line-by-line copyists. 312 It is a huge concession
which only targets the fast-fashion retailers who blatantly copy fashion designs without adding much creative value to the industry. 313 Hemphill and
Suk pointed out that line-by-line copying is extremely detrimental to innovation. 314 It reduces the profits of the original designers and diminishes the
demand for original works. 315 The copyright infringement standard under the
IDPA is “substantially identical,” 316 which is different from the “substantial
similarity” standard prevalent in copyright law. 317 Although there is no judicial precedent on the interpretation of “substantially identical,”318 the IDPA
defines the term as an article of apparel that is so similar in appearance that
it is likely to be mistaken for protected designs and contains only those differences in construction or designs which are merely trivial. 319 The language
itself suggests that “substantially identical” presents a much higher threshold
than the “substantially similar” infringement standard. In other words, the
resemblance between the original design and the knockoff must be close
enough to be deemed “substantially identical” to infringe. 320
307. See Chung, supra note 40, at 504-05, 507, 519, 581.
308. See Rita Choy & Suzanne Loker, Mass Customization of Wedding Gowns: Design Involvement
on the Internet, 22 CLO. & TEXT. RCH. J. 79, 79-87 (2004).
309. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 8 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that “in
three years a designer will have time to recoup the work that went into designing the article, develop
additional lines, or license lines to retailers.” ).
310. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(a).
311. See Tina Martin, Fashion Law Needs Custom Tailored Protection for Designs, 48 U. BALT. L.
REV. 453, 470 (2018); see also IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(b)(3).
312. See infra Part V.
313. See Rosen, supra note 40, at 349; see also Ellis, supra note 267, at 205-06.
314. See Chung, supra note 40, at 501.
315. See Zerbo, supra note 11, at 603-03, 606; see also Alissandra Burack, Is Fashion an Art Form
That Should Be Protected or Merely a Constantly Changing Media Encouraging Replication of Popular
Trends, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. LJ 605, 606-7 (2010).
316. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(e)(3).
317. See Victoria Elman, From the Runway to the Courtroom: How Substantial Similarity is Unfit
for Fashion, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 683, 685-94 (2008).
318. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39 (statement of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of Virginia Law School); see id. (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School).
319. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(a).
320. See infra Part V.A.
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In short, the IDPA grants limited but essential protection for fashion
designers to prevent their designs from being appropriated by fast-fashion
retailers who do not bother to modify the designs or intentionally copy the
whole work to deprive the incentives of the original fashion designers. 321 As
long as the newly created work is not “substantially identical” to the original
design or is a result of independent creation, it will not be prohibited. 322 The
IDPA allows fashion companies to carry on a fashion trend and create other
designs inspired by the protected works. 323 It will also encourage fast-fashion
retailers to add value to any fashion designs they appreciate and carry on the
fashion trend by creating inspired works. 324 Finally, the IDPA will not slow
down fashion cycles, as asserted by the “Piracy Paradox” doctrine, but instead encourage copyists to create inspired works that would ultimately be
beneficial to the fashion industry and the general welfare. 325 Fast fashion retailers, such as H&M, with mechanisms to avoid line-by-line copying by reinterpreting and readapting popular design elements would not be affected. 326 Giving fashion designers a limited period of exclusive rights and
control of their work while allowing the public to utilize their works after the
protection expires is in line with the principle of the welfare theory.
B. Fairness Theory
Fairness theory suggests that, without creators’ intelligent labors, the
raw materials of creative works are of little creative value. 327 Creators of
original works deserve the “natural right” to control their creations and to be
rewarded for their efforts. 328 Professor Amy Landers also notes that fashion
piracy presents an unfair problem that is not faced by other creative industries in the United States. 329 The replication of a few early designs could be

321. See Monseau, supra note 305, at 67, 69; see also Tedmond Wong, To Copy or Not to Copy, that
is the Question: the Game Theory Approach to Protecting Fashion Designs, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1139,
1160 (2011); see also Courtney Daniels, Made in America: Is the IDPPPA the Answer to the United
States Fashion Industry’s Quest for Design Protection, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 113, 148 (2011).
322. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2.
323. See Xiao, supra note 267, at 441.
324. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1175.
325. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1722 (“If copying were illegal, the fashion cycle
would occur very slowly.”); see also Elise Ruff, If the Shoe Fits: The Effects of a Uniform Copyright
Design Test on Local Fashion Designers, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. I, 275 (2017); see also
Stover, supra note 8, at 264.
326. See Stover, supra note 8, at 264-65.
327. See Stephanie Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 BUL REV. 1487,
1501 (2017).
328. See Bair, supra note 326, at 1501; see also Zerbo, supra note 11, at 621.
329. See Amy L. Landers, The Anti-Economy of Fashion; An Openwork Approach to Intellectual
Property Protection, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 427, 473-74 (2014).
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problematic to the fashion industry as it deprives fashion designers’ incentives to create original designs. 330 She wonders why fashion piracy is allowed
in the industry and yet Congress has not taken any serious steps to stop it. 331
Fashion designers transform raw materials into fashionable items. Hernandez said that fashion designs are born in fashion designers’ imaginations
and fashion designers create “something from nothing at all.” 332 They often
invest a substantial amount of time and money in their works, and it takes
about fifty weeks or even more for them to create a collection to be presented
in a fashion show. 333 With these upfront expenses, the subsequent sale of
designs is crucial for fashion designers to make some money to support
themselves and to continue to create. 334 They normally profit from their original designs by collaborating with mass-market retailers 335 to produce
cheaper derivative works based on their main lines for a more expansive audience. 336 Some fashion designers also authorize or license their designs to
mass-market retailers to produce ready-to-wear copies. 337 It is unfair to them
if others can copy their hard work without compensating their creative and
intelligent labors.
Knockoffs are substitutes for the original designs and jeopardize the
original fashion designers’ opportunities to seek potential buyers to recoup
their costs of labor. 338 Widespread fashion piracy hinders the establishment
of such partnerships. 339 It also makes it impossible for fashion designers to
sell collections to stores when the garments have already been knocked
off. 340 Who would pay the original fashion designers for their works if there
are cheaper knockoffs readily available in the market? 341 Some commentators argue that extensive copyright protection will deprive the public’s right

330. See id. at 481-98.
331. See id. at 482-84.
332. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
333. See Sponsiello, supra note 17, at 12-13 (explaining a traditional fashion production cycle).
334. See Misha Nonoo, Fashion Businesses Are No Longer a Worthwhile Investment, FORTUNE
(Aug. 11, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/08/11/fashion-industry-investment-misha-nonoo/
[https://perma.cc/AA45-CDXR].
335. See Aya Eguchi, Curtailing Copycat Couture: The Merits of the Innovative Design Protection
and Piracy Prevention Act and a Licensing Scheme for the Fashion Industry, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 131,
151-55 (2011).
336. See Margaux Rollet et al., The Concept of Creative Collaboration Applied to the Fashion Industry, 4 J. GLOB. FASHION MKTG. 57, 57-66 (2013); see also Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 5
(statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
337. See id.
338. See Peter H. Bloch, Ronald F. Bush & Leland Campbell, Consumer “Accomplices” in Product
Counterfeiting: A Demand Side Investigation, 10 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 27, 28-32 (1993).
339. See Mariachiara Colucci, Elisa Montaguti & Umberto Lago, Managing Brand Extension via
Licensing: An Investigation into the High-End Fashion Industry, 25 INT’L J. RSCH. MKTG. 129, 130-37
(2008).
340. See Brewer, supra note 14, at 760; see also Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement
of Lazaro Hernandez, Fashion Designer & Co—Founder, Proenza Schouler).
341. See Margaret Bruce & Lucy Daly, Buyer Behaviour for Fast Fashion, 10 J. FASHION MKTG.
MGMT. 329, 340-44 (2006).
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to purchase affordable designs produced by fast-fashion retailers. 342 They
blame fashion designers for not making their designs more affordable. 343
Nonetheless, fashion designers are only able to offer their affordable, readyto-wear collections if they can sell their original designs to mass-market retailers. 344 Fashion piracy makes it very difficult for fashion designers to
move from high-priced fashion to developing affordable renditions.
Fast fashion retailers have exploited loopholes in this low IP law regime
which have caused unfair and severe damage to fashion designers who lose
orders every day. 345 They also deprive fashion designers’ opportunities to
receive recognition and access to creative positions that they deserve based
on their creative investments. 346 Emerging fashion designers are even more
vulnerable because they lack the ability and resources to protect their designs
from fashion piracy. 347 Without sufficient IP protection for fashion designs,
many fashion designers have been put out of business before they have had
a chance to be recognized. 348 It would be unfair to deny copyright protection
to this vulnerable group. 349 Fashion piracy is spoiling things with undue
haste. If fast fashion retailers keep appropriating fashion designers’ works
for free, these fashion designers risk being wiped out. Ultimately, the American fashion industry will suffer from the loss of young creative talents in the
field. 350 This vicious cycle will never end if we do not stop fashion piracy.
The three years of copyright protection offered by the IDPA is a fair protection for fashion designers to safeguard their designs against line-by-line copyists. It would be unfair to deny such fundamental, yet not overly restrictive,
laws to protect the labor they invested in their works according to the fairness
theory. 351
C. Personality Theory
Personality theory is more predominant in civil law countries and provides strong support for moral rights. 352 Its underlying rationale is that creative works are manifestations of the personalities of their creators, and the
342. See Allison De Vore, The Battle Between the Courthouse and the Fashion House: Creating a
Tailored Solution for Copyright Protection of Artistic Fashion Designs, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 193,
210 (2013).
343. See id. at 209-11.
344. See Colucci, Montaguti & Lago, supra note 338, at 130-32; see also Hearing on H.R. 2511,
supra note 39, at 5 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez saying that but only after they offer their own more
affordable ready-to-wear lines based on their high-end collections).
345. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
346. See id.
347. See Janssens & Lavanga, supra note 46, at 244-48; see also Garcia, supra note 147, at 343-44.
348. See Gil Appel et al., supra note 27, at 591-605.
349. See Janssens & Lavanga, supra note 46, at 229-33; See also Rosen, supra note 40, at 329.
350. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
351. See Bair, supra note 326, at 1501-14.
352. See Giorgio Resta, Personnalité, Persönlichkeit, Personality: Comparative Perspectives on the
Protection of Identity in Private Law.” 1 EUR. J. COMPAR. L. & GOVERNANCE 215, 216-17 (2014).
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legal system should grant the creator the power to control the use or modification of their works. 353 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) 354
grants certain moral rights to artists.355 However, it does not protect fashion
designs. 356 Line-by-line knockoffs often distort the original designs and
eventually damage fashion designers’ reputations that directly correlate with
sales as well. 357 This is a major issue for individual fashion designers, particularly for those who are working to establish their identity in the market. 358
On the other hand, some commentators argue that fashion designs are useful
articles and should not be protected by copyright law. 359 However, Professor
Susan Scafidi commented that it is essential to differentiate fashion from
clothing. 360 Clothing is the basic useful article that covers the human body
and serves other functional purposes, while fashion design is a unique form
of art that should be recognized and appreciated as such. 361
Fashion designers are artists and clothing is the medium through which
they express their independent creative ideas, 362 especially in this booming
era of social media and digital fashion.363 For example, the notorious “meat
dress” designed by Franc Fernandez that Lady Gaga wore to the 2010 MTV
Video Music Awards Ceremony. 364 The dress was not only a functional piece
but also an artistic design meant to inspire and to express the contemplation
of the fashion designer 365 Gaga said that the meat dress was a statement of
protest against the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and the government restrictions placed on the rights of gay soldiers. 366 Fashion designers
have responded that seeing their designs selling at a much cheaper price is

353. See id. at 218-26.
354. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2020).
355. See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 945, 951-52 (1990).
356. See id. at 949-51; see also Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5128, 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506).
357. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1176.
358. See Rosen, supra note 40, at 344; see also Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39 (statement of
Lazaro Hernandez).
359. See id.
360. See Susan Scafidi, Creation, Destruction, and the Future of Fashion, 30 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 393, 396 (2019); see also Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 24, at 19 (statement
of Susan Scafidi saying that fashion is a form of creative expression while clothing is an article of dress
that cover the body); see also Nagel, supra note 267, at 666.
361. See id.
362. See LEAH ARMSTRONG & FELICE MCDOWELL, FASHIONING PROFESSIONALS: IDENTITY AND
REPRESENTATION AT WORK IN THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, 1-26 (2018).
363. See SYNNE SKJULSTAD, VETEMENTS, MEMES, AND CONNECTIVITY: FASHION MEDIA IN THE
ERA OF INSTAGRAM, 24 FASHION THEORY 181, 181-209 (2020).
364. See ADAM GECZY & VICKI KARAMINAS, LADY GAGA: AMERICAN HORROR STORY, FASHION,
MONSTROSITY AND THE GROTESQUE, 21 FASHION THEORY 709, 727 (2017).
365. See id. at 727-728.
366. See id. at 728.
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an ugly nightmare. 367 It is essential to protect fashion designers’ personhoods. The IDPA can discourage fast-fashion retailers from destroying the
original fashion designs by urging them to create inspired works rather than
a close but distorted copy. 368 Fashion designers’ legal rights and artistic output could be better safeguarded even though they do not have the same extensive rights that are granted by the VARA to artistic works. 369
D. Culture Theory
Culture theory is the least influential of the four theories, but Professor
William Fisher comments that the theory is potentially the most powerful of
all. 370 Culture theory suggests that copyright law can help foster a just and
attractive culture in a society, for example promoting a richer artistic tradition 371 or empowering education. 372 If fashion piracy is left unregulated, both
the American fashion industry and the broader culture will be dominated by
the mindset of: “You create first, I copy second.” 373 According to Mckinsey
& Company, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated fashion industry
trends in 2021, with shopping shifting to online channels and consumers continuing to “champion fairness and social justice.” 374 A recent empirical research by Gazzola et al. also found from a survey conducted online with over
a thousand of respondents, that the respondents generally desire fashion companies could apply more ethical and sustainable strategies in their future
businesses. 375 Customers are also found to be paying more attention to sustainability and environmental issues caused by fast-fashion retailers. 376 Fast
fashion retailers have accelerated the fashion cycle, which has led to many

367. See Singh-Kurtz, supra note 16 (Designer had expressed and said on a blog that “[I] didn’t even
want to post this on my feed cause it looks ugly but I’m so mad…. I know it’s pretty common in fast
fashion for big brands to copy other designers buy I thought they would at least make some changes
instead of replicating the design down to the number of rows in the stripes. The level of detail being
identical is proof that this was no coincidence.”).
368. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 208, at 1176.
369. See id.
370. See Fisher, supra note 278, at 33-36.
371. See Ronald Dworkin, Art as a Public Good, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 143, 153-57 (1985) (contending that the more “resonant” the “shared language” of a culture - the richer it is in representation,
metaphor, and allusion - the more opportunities for creativity and subtlety in communication and thought
it affords all persons).
372. See Dan Hunter & Lastowka F. Gregory, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951
(2004).
373. See Veronique Pouillard, Design Piracy in the Fashion Industries of Paris and New York in the
Interwar Years, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 319, 330-31 (2011).
374. See Business of Fashion, The State of Fashion Report 2021, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Mar. 22,
2021),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/state-of-fashion
[https://perma.cc/SXG9-QATU].
375. See Patrizia Gazzola et al., Trends in the Fashion Industry. The Perception of Sustainability and
Circular Economy: A Gender/Generation Quantitative Approach, 7 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 14 (2020).
376. See id. at 1, 15; see also Lisa McNeill & Rebecca Moore, Sustainable Fashion Consumption
and the Fast Fashion Conundrum: Fashionable Consumers and Attitudes to Sustainability in Clothing
Choice, 39 INT’L J. CONSR. STUD. 212, 222 (2015).
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environmental issues. 377 Some proceeds have gone to institutions that support child labor, animal testing, gruesome factory conditions and terrorist
activities. 378 As argued under the fairness theory, allowing copyists to knock
off fashion designers’ creative works is unfair. Having the opportunity to
buy cheap knockoffs might not be the dominant social norm in the country
anymore.
Historically, fashion designs have fostered cultural in the United
States. 379 Alongside the increasing globalization of the fashion industry,
fashion designs have become highly adaptive to the current concerns of contemporary culture, while also drawing on influences from the past, such as
historical fashion styles or cultural and regional forms of dress. 380 Some major museums in the United States have started to exhibit fashion collections
in recent years in recognition of their cultural and artistic value. 381 Clothing
has gradually evolved from a purely utilitarian product to a form of wearable
culture over the past centuries. 382 Fashion serves purposes beyond wearability and many fashion designs have become iconic symbols of various periods. 383 If fashion piracy continues to be unregulated and the fast fashion
companies continue producing knockoffs, the number of knockoffs could
possibly fill a fashion museum that represents solely the current fashion culture. Forever 21 will certainly need to have a ballroom just for its collections
of knockoffs. 384 While we do not know the latest social norm, the IDPA can
certainly foster a “Copy Less, Create More” culture.385 Nonetheless, an empirical study should be conducted in the future to discover the current social
norms in the United States regarding fashion culture and the general perspective on fashion piracy.

377. See Najmul K. Kaikobad et al., Fast Fashion: Marketing, Recycling and Environmental Issues,
4 INT’L J. HUM. SOC. SCI. INV. 28, 30-33 (2015).
378. See generally Kirsi Niinim. . .ki et al., The Environmental Price of Fast Fashion, 1 NATURE
REV. EARTH & ENVR. 189 (2020); see also John Hobson, To Die For? The Health and Safety of Fast
Fashion, 63 OCCP. MED. J. 317, 319 (2013).
379. See generally ROBIN GIVHAN, FLATIRON BOOKS (2015).
380. See VÉRONIQUE POUILLARD, PRODUCTION AND MANUFACTURE, IN THE END OF FASHION:
CLOTHING AND DRESS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 141-54 (Adam Geczy & Vicki Karaminas eds.,
2019).
381. See JULIA PETROV, WINDOW SHOPPING: COMMERCIAL INSPIRATION FOR FASHION IN THE
MUSEUM, IN FASHION, HISTORY, MUSEUMS: INVENTING THE DISPLAY OF DRESS, 31-62 (2019).
382. See generally JOANNE ENTWISTLE, THE FASHIONED BODY: FASHION, DRESS AND SOCIAL
THEORY (2015).
383. See ANDREA HAUSER, INTERNATIONAL FASHION SHOWS: CREATING TRANSCULTURAL
RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH CLOTHING, IN FASHION AND MATERIALITY: CULTURAL PRACTICES IN
GLOBAL CONTEXTS, 241-59 (Heike Jenss & Viola Hofmann eds., 2020).
384. See Véronque Hyland, The Museum at FIT’s New Exhibits All About Knockoffs, THE CUT (Mar.
22,
2021),
https://www.thecut.com/2014/11/new-fashion-exhibit-thats-all-about-knockoffs.html
[https://perma.cc/47TC-ZYQE].
385. See Infra Part V.C.
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V. ANALYSIS OF IDPA’S SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGNS
AND ITS IMPERATIVE IMPLICATIONS ON AMERICAN FASHION CULTURE
A. Knockoffs that are “Substantially Identical” to the Originals are Prohibited
Under the current low-IP equilibrium, Kardashian’s husband’s dress
may not be protected by a various aspects of IP laws in the United States. 386
As Kardashian’s husband has never applied for a design patent for the dress,
it is not protected by the design patent doctrine. 387 In terms of trademark
protection, the design does not contain any registered logos on the fabric and
is thus not protected by trademark law. 388 Furthermore, the dress is a new
design and its form has not acquired any secondary meaning in customers’
minds, it would not be protected under the trade dress doctrine either. 389 In
terms of copyright protection, the Court in Star Athletica reiterated that it
was not extending protection to the aesthetic aspects of a fashion design unless they are separable from the functional aspects.390 Separating artistic elements of a fashion design from its functional aspects is difficult even for
experts in the fashion industry and judges should not give any aesthetic judgment. 391 The first challenge for the court to tackle in the Kardashian case is
whether the aesthetic features of the dress are separately protectable. The
second challenge is whether Missguided has infringed on the design.
Missguided copied the entire form of Kardashian’s dress but it did not copy
any PGS work. It is unlikely for the court to find the dress protectable under
traditional copyright law according to Star Athletica. Thus, there is no protection for the dress under the current low-IP equilibrium.
The IDPA serves to plug the current legal loophole by prohibiting blatant line-by-line copying similar to the scenario between Kardashian and
Missguided. The IDPA clarifies what kind of fashion designs are protectable,
and it eliminates judicial subjectivity and the involvement of judges’ aesthetic preferences. 392 The apparel items that are protectable under the IDPA
include clothing, handbags, purses, belts and eyeglass frame. 393 Nevertheless, the list is not exhaustive as the definition of fashion clothing could be
very broad. 394 The IDPA protects the overall appearance of a fashion design

386. See supra Part II.
387. See supra Part II.B.
388. See supra Part II.A(1).
389. See supra Part II.A(2).
390. See supra Part II.C(2).
391. See Mark A. LoBello, The Dichotomy between Artistic Expression and Industrial Design: To
Protect or Not to Protect, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 107, 109 (1992).
392. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(a)(10).
393. See id.
394. See Caen Dennis, AI-Generated Fashion Designs: Who or What Owns the Goods, 30 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ 593, 599-600 (2019).
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including the “arrangement or placement” of original or non-original elements as incorporated in the overall appearance.395 As long as the design
falls within the definition of apparel, e.g., clothing, undergarments, outwear,
judges can avoid the trouble of having to abstractly separate protectable elements from a design where Star Athletica offers very little guidance. Furthermore, the standard of infringement under the IDPA is “substantially
identical” such that the appearance of the knockoff is likely to be mistaken
for the protected design. 396 When comparing Kardashian’s dress with
Missguided, a viewer can see that the color, the oval opening at the waist,
the proportion of the two pieces, and the draped fabric that wraps around the
hips with a knot on the front made the dresses “substantially identical” to
each other. 397 Courts may also consider applying the ordinary observer test
or rely on expert testimony to assist them in making a consistent and objective judgment. 398 Accordingly to the IDPA, Missguided’s blatant line-byline knockoff might constitute an infringement.
Nonetheless, to balance the exclusive right granted to fashion designers,
the IDPA requires a fashion designer in an infringement action to satisfy a
heightened set of pleading requirements before infringement can be established. 399 The pleading standard requires the fashion designer to show that
the protected fashion design (i) was a protectable item; (ii) available in such
a manner that the court can infer that the infringer had seen or had knowledge
of the protected design; and (iii) the infringer had indeed infringed the design. 400 A fashion designer also needs to give written notice to the infringer
twenty-one days before commencing any infringement action. 401 An infringer shall be liable only for damages and profits accrued after the date on
which the action for infringement is commenced. 402 It means that an infringer
will bear no legal liability if he ceases to continue to infringe. By heightening
the pleading standard, the IDPA can eliminate frivolous lawsuits. 403 And the
written notice requirement will oblige the fashion designer to try to resolve
the issue with the infringer first.
Under the IDPA, Kardashian’s husband would have to first write to
Missguided and explain why he thinks Missguided has infringed the work.
This notice requirement significantly improves two issues currently faced by

395. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(a)(8).
396. See id. at § 2(a)(11).
397. See supra Figure 2.
398. See Soucek, supra note 163, at 437, 450; see also Buccafusco & Jeanne, supra note 142, at 80.
399. See Monseau, supra note 305, at 55.
400. See id.
401. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(e).
402. See id.
403. See Eguchi, supra note 334, at 148; see also Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 15 (2011)
(statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School stating that the IDPPPA, unlike the
DPPA, contains a heightened pleading standard aimed at reducing frivolous litigation.)
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fashion designers. First, it will stop infringers to openly admit their infringing act similar to what Missguided posted on its Instagram. Otherwise, it
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge and infringement. Furthermore, the IDPA creates an opportunity for the infringer to negotiate with the
original fashion designers to come up with settlement terms or to obtain a
license. With such a provision, fashion designers will have the grounds to
bargain for what they deserve rather than having their complaints ignored by
the infringers. It will not be detrimental to other fashion designers who genuinely want to promote creativity in the fashion industry. With the IDPA,
Missguided will have to either take down the dress from its website after
receiving a notice from Kardashian or will not be that overconfident to challenge Kardashian of being so slow to launch the products to the market.
Missguided can also wait until the three-year protection expires, or create
inspired works that contain fewer elements of the original design and more
of its own style. 404 The protection granted by the IDPA is thin but essential
to stop blatant line-by-line copying. This offers a well-thought-out solution
to balance the interests of fashion designers, copyists, and the public. There
is nothing for the industry to worry about if they have no intention to blatantly appropriate someone else’s designs and genuinely want to foster a
fashion trend with their own inspired works.
B. Inspired Works and Works Created Independently are Not Affected
Roberts’ case illustrates why the IDPA will not hinder innovation nor
trend formation in the fashion industry. Old Navy was right that Roberts had
not registered any trademark for the phrase “Raising the Future” printed on
the t-shirt, and thus Roberts cannot rely on any trademark protection. 405 Roberts did not apply for a design patent, and even if she did, the USPTO will
likely not grant her a design patent for the t-shirt given the obvious and nonnovel nature of the design. 406 In terms of copyright protection, the design of
the t-shirt may not meet the “substantially identical” threshold because the
color, spacing, and fonts of the words in the knockoff design are slightly
different from the original. 407 Furthermore, printing words on t-shirts is a
very customary way of designing in the fashion industry and copyright law
does not protect scène à faire, ideas or words such as “Raising the Future.” 408
Even if the court finds the prints are “substantially identical,” the infringer
can still argue that the designs are not unique, distinguishable, non-trivial

404. See Chung, supra note 40, at 531.
405. See supra Figure 1.
406. See supra Part II.B(1).
407. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(f)(3)(A).
408. See Farzaneh, supra note 158, at 425; see also Derek E. Bambauer, Paths or Fences: Patents,
Copyrights, and the Constitution, 104 LOWA L. REV. 1017, 1054-55 (2018); see also Chung, supra note
40, at 542.
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and non-utilitarian as required by the IDPA. 409 Furthermore, any works that
are the results of a designer’s own creative endeavor are not protected either. 410 As long as Old Navy can provide evidence to show that it created the
design independently without any prior knowledge of Roberts’ design, there
would not be any infringement. 411
In addition, the IDPA will also impose pressure on sellers, importers
and distributors to ensure that the designs they sell, import or distribute are
not knockoffs. The IDPA states that if a seller, importer and distributor has
actual or constructive knowledge that the works might be an infringing article, they will be held liable for the infringement as well.412 By enacting the
IDPA, industry stakeholders will be more careful when handling orders from
fast-fashion retailers and cancel their orders if there is any suspicion of violation of the IDPA. In order for fast-fashion retailers to continue their businesses as usual, they would be more incentivized to “copy less and create
more” to produce inspired works rather than line-by-line copies. Last but not
least, the IDPA excludes certain fashion designs from the protection that are
embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer more than
three years before the date upon which the protection of the design is asserted. 413 Overall, the protection granted by the IDPA is thin and will not
hinder other fashion designers to produce inspired works based on the original designs.
C. Implications on Fostering an Innovative and Respectful Fashion Culture
After examining the piracy issue in the American fashion industry, we
understand that fashion designers are mostly harmed by line-by-line
knockoffs that jeopardize their opportunities to sell their original designs to
mass-market retailers and collaborate with other brands. The major issue is
not whether copying should be allowed, but rather how much copying should
be allowed such that the interests of fashion designers and the wider society
can be balanced. Ultimately, the IDPA can promote a more innovative and
respective fashion culture in the United States. Line-by-line knockoffs do not
add any creative value to a fashion trend but inspired works do.414 It would
also be beneficial for society to see a more diverse portfolio of inspired
works in the market rather than a number of knockoffs (clones). Oftentimes,
fast-fashion retailers can produce inspired works but they are not incentivized to do so under the current IP law regime.

409. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(a).
410. See id.
411. See Chatterjee, supra note 289, at 562; see also Chung, supra note 40, at 531-32; see also Dennis, supra note 393, at 602-4.
412. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(f)(2)(B).
413. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(b).
414. See supra Part IV.

2022

STOP GLORIFYING FASHION PIRACY

207

The IDPA can encourage fast-fashion retailers to “copy less and create
more.” According to game theory, players in the market will find a way to
minimize their losses and maximize their gains in a game. 415 If the IDPA is
enacted and “substantially identical” knockoffs will constitute an infringement, fashion designers will start sending a cease-and-decease letter to infringing fast-fashion retailers. Even though there is a window period for the
infringer to take down the infringing knockoffs, it involves costs and time to
handle the disputes. 416 To minimize the costs, fast fashion retailers will be
more incentivized to take the “copy less and create more” approach.417 In
essence, customers will still be able to find low-priced inspired works that
may be “substantially similar” but not “substantially identical” in the market
which will also foster innovation and trend development in the industry. It is
a way to permit fashion designers to protect their designs while not unduly
restricting the freedom of the fashion industry to simultaneously manufacture clothing and sustain trends. Consumers will continue to enjoy a greater
diversity in the fashion industry with more inspired works and fewer lineby-line knockoffs. Fast fashion retailers can carry on their piracy business as
usual and fashion designers’ reputations and personhoods in their fashion
designs will be better safeguarded. 418
Moreover, passing the IDPA will have a symbolized educative effect
according to expressive theory. 419 Although the IDPA only targets the specific line-by-line knockoffs, it can educate the stakeholders in the industry
and the public to respect the creative minds of fashion designers. 420 Fashion
design education in the United States is currently facing a challenge on how
to teach fashion students not to copy others’ designs if copying is not illegal.
Scafidi says that it is difficult to explain to law students and designers that
the current IP regime does not consider fashion designs to be worthy of protection. 421 Furthermore, emerging fashion designers find it difficult to access
the creative positions they deserve and to be recognized for their designs
given there are plenty of knockoffs in the market. With the enactment of the
IDPA, schools and universities can adjust their curricula to teach students
how to develop fashion collections creatively and independently given the
home sewing exception provided in the IDPA. 422 Students will learn to respect others’ designs as much as others respect theirs. Retailers will invest
415. See Wong, supra note 320, at 1165-71.
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. See supra Part IV.C.
419. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745,
1759-61 (2012).
420. See id. at 1790.
421. See Hearing on H.R. 5055, supra note 24, at 78 (statement of Susan Scafidi).
422. See IDPA S. 3523, supra note 277, at § 2(f) & (i) (The IDPA allows anyone to produce a single
copy of a protected design for personal use or for the use of an immediate family member if that copy is
not for sale. It allows students or other designers to get inspired by reproducing the works without infringing it).
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in their in-house fashion designers and collaborate with creatives talents rather than “shop” in fashion shows and treat other fashion designers as “free
sources of ideas.” 423
Fashion piracy has been around for over nine decades and yet elements
that foster fashion trend formation have been misunderstood and fashion designers have been falsely accused to be copyists themselves. Roberts’ quote
“Rising the Future” serves as a relevant ending note. Lawmakers must balance the interests of the public today when they draft laws. Nonetheless, the
society also needs to foster a better culture for future generations. The threeyear sui generis copyright protection is thin but has an imperative implication to the American fashion culture. Copyright laws were written in 1976
when America was largely a country of manufacturers rather than designers. 424 Both the global fashion industry and American fashion culture have
changed so fast. It is time for Congress to reconsider amending copyright
law and enact the IPDA. Hopefully, Americans will be able to see the benefits of the law through more innovative, inspired works and fewer line-byline knockoffs in the future. Most importantly, fashion designers will be
well-respected and incentivized.
CONCLUSION
Fashion piracy has deprived fashion designers of their incentives to create and the opportunities to receive the recognition they deserve. The current
low-IP regime in the United States has failed to adequately protect fashion
designs. The “Piracy Paradox” doctrine reflects an obsolete understanding
of fashion theories and trend formation and may no longer apply to our understanding of contemporary American fashion culture. While inspired
works might induce fashion trend formation, line-by-line knockoffs do not.
Congress should extend limited sui generis copyright protection to fashion
designs to prohibit line-by-line knockoffs without interfering with the production of inspired works. Very little is needed to significantly improve the
fashion piracy issue in the United States. The IDPA is a well-thought-out
and narrowly-tailored bill that provides three-year limited protection for
fashion designers to safeguard their original designs. The IDPA only protects
unique and original designs and the standard to qualify for protection is high.
Copyists are still allowed to create other inspired works or wait until the
three-year term expires. The amendment to copyright law will encourage the
production of inspired works and customers will benefit from having more
options to choose from in the market. The IDPA will also stimulate creative
workers to develop their own designs independently. Ultimately, it will pro-

423. See Hearing on H.R. 2511, supra note 39, at 8 (statement of Lazaro Hernandez).
424. See generally Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 NYL SCH. L.
REV. 477(1976).
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mote a respectful and innovative American fashion culture. Without adequate IP protection, the creativity that put American fashion in a world-class
position might soon dry up.

